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Constitutionalism and Democracy: An Essay in
Honor of Stanley N. Katz
IRWIN P. STOTZKYt
PROLOGUE
On February 23-24, 2007, the Program in Law and Public Affairs,
the Woodrow Wilson School, the History Department, and the American
Studies Department of Princeton University honored Stanley N. Katz by
holding a conference to analyze and celebrate his extraordinary public
career. A committee of his colleagues and former students planned the
conference. It included a mixture of formal and informal sessions on the
themes and issues that have been important in his professional career.
Panels explored topics in public policy, colonial history, American legal
history, the history of nonprofits and philanthropy, the use of technology
in teaching and scholarship, and the public humanities-all areas in
which Katz has made important contributions.
It was an extraordinary conference. Several hundred people-
including students, colleagues, and friends-attended and participated.
Some delivered papers about his intellectual legacy, others gave talks
about his personal and professional achievements, and still others made
penetrating comments or asked serious questions about the
presentations.
His career clearly deserved this outpouring of support. Stanley N.
Katz is President Emeritus of the American Council of Learned Socie-
ties, the leading organization in humanistic scholarship and education in
the United States. He currently holds the position of Lecturer with the
rank of Professor in the Woodrow Wilson School of Princeton
University.
Formerly Class of 1921 Bicentennial Professor of American Law
and Liberty at Princeton University, Katz has taught in the history
department at Harvard (1957-65) and held tenured positions in the his-
tory department at Wisconsin (1965-71) and at the University of Chi-
cago Law School (1971-78). Over the years, he has been a visitor at
several other law schools.
t Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Study of Human Rights, University of
Miami School of Law. I wish to thank Sylvia-Rebecca Gutidrrez for her excellent research
assistance. I also wish to thank the editorial board of the University of Miami Law Review,
particularly Laura J. Tepich and Michael S. Pieciak, for their fine editorial work. Copyright Irwin
P. Stotzky and University of Miami Law Review, 2008.
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Katz graduated Magna Cum Laude from Harvard University in
1955 with a major in English History and Literature. He received his
M.A. from Harvard in 1954 and his Ph.D. in the same field from
Harvard in 1961. He attended Harvard Law School in 1969-70.
He is a renowned scholar of American legal and constitutional his-
tory, and on philanthropy and nonprofit institutions. He is the Editor of
the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the
United States and of the forthcoming Oxford International Encyclopedia
of Legal History (2009). Katz is the author and editor of scores of arti-
cles and books. He has served as president of the Organization of Amer-
ican Historians and the American Society of Legal History and as vice
president of the Research Division of the American Historical Organiza-
tion. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Newberry Library,
the Copyright Clearance Center and many other institutions. He is cur-
rently president of the International Society for Cultural Property. He is
a commissioner of the National Historic Publication and Records Com-
mission. He also currently serves as chair of the American Council of
Learned Societies/Social Science Research Council Working Group on
Cuba. Katz is a member of the New Jersey Council for the Humanities,
the American Antiquarian Society, the American Philosophical Society;
a fellow of the American Society for Legal History, the American Acad-
emy of Arts and Sciences, and the Society of American Historians; a
corresponding member of the Massachusetts Historical Society; and an
Academico Correspondiente of the Cuban Academy of Science. He has
honorary degrees from several universities.
Katz is currently working in the international arena. His recent
research focuses upon the relationship of civil society and constitutional-
ism to democracy, and upon the relationship of the United States to the
international human rights regime.
My relationship with Stanley Katz began in the early 1970s, when I
was a student at the University of Chicago Law School. In addition to
being a student in two of his classes, I worked on an independent
research project under his supervision on the role of rank-and-file work-
ers in union organizing and democratization in the steel industry.
As a law professor, Katz became a role model, in the best sense of
that term, for countless students. In particular, students admired Katz for
his keen intelligence and unquestioned integrity. While he constantly
pushed students into questioning their assumptions, he did so in a gentle,
positive way. Indeed, students often described Katz in the following
manner: "Everyone doesn't like someone, but nobody doesn't like Stan-
ley Katz." For anyone who knows anything about law schools and the
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relationship between faculty and students, this is a highly unusual and
positive expression about a law school professor!
Our relationship developed deeper ties when I began to work in the
area of democratic transitions, first in Argentina and later in Haiti.
Indeed, it was a great pleasure for me to have delivered this paper and to
have had the opportunity to discuss such a complicated and complex
topic-the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes-at this
conference honoring Stanley N. Katz. I am particularly pleased to honor
Stanley Katz because of the intellectual, moral, and emotional support
he has given me over the years as I have pursued the topic both in writ-
ing and in practice.
I. THE WORK OF STANLEY N. KATz
As the speakers at the conference in honor of Stanley N. Katz have
demonstrated, history and law, particularly constitutional law, have been
at the core of his work. In his eleven year reign as the President of the
American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), the focus of his consti-
tutional law concerns shifted to comparative constitutionalism and to
constitutionalism outside the United States. In the mid-1980s, in
response to a Ford Foundation request to help it determine what Ford
might do to commemorate the Bicentennial of the United States Consti-
tution, Stan organized a project on the idea of constitutionalism. The
result was a large grant for an ACLS project on comparative constitu-
tionalism. The project began in 1987, lasted about five years, and cov-
ered Latin America, South/Southeast Asia, and Europe (both West and
East). Stan presented his ideas that derived from this project in the Jef-
ferson Lecture that he delivered at the University of California at Berke-
ley in 20001 and in a book he coedited in 1993.2
In his Jefferson Lecture, Stan examines two different conceptions
of constitutionalism. The first account is an idealist, rationalist account.
It suggests that there are rationally specific limits to constitutionalism.
Stan quotes Walter Murphy's definition as the basic Western notion of
liberal democratic constitutionalism:
Constitutionalism... enshrines respect for human worth and dignity
as its central principle. To protect that value, citizens must have a
right to political participation, and their government must be hedged
in by substantive limits on what it can do, even when perfectly mir-
1. Stanley N. Katz, Constitutionalism, Contestation, and Civil Society, 8 COMMON
KNOWLEDGE 287 (2002).
2. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DE-MocRAcy: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
(Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
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roring the popular will.3
The second, contrasting account, described by a Kenyan lawyer from an
African point of view claims:
[Aill law, and constitutional law in particular, is concerned, not with
abstract norms, but with the creation, distribution, exercise, legitima-
tion, effects, and reproduction of power; it matters not whether that
power lies with the state or in some other organized entity. From this
perspective, therefore, the very idea of law, hence of a constitution as
a special body of law, entails commitment or adherence to a theory of
organized power ... .
Not surprisingly, Stan comes down on the African side of constitu-
tionalism. He argues that constitutionalism must emerge from the partic-
ular indigenous political controversies and that its final form is,
therefore, unpredictable. He defines constitutionalism in this way:
[S]horn of universals, what is constitutionalism? To my mind, if there
is an essence of constitutionalism (and I believe there is), it is not to
be found in the structure of the constitutional arrangements and insti-
tutions that are established in a particular country. Rather, it is to be
found in the practice of constitutionalism, in a form of politics that is
based on the notion of respect for the rule of law, in which the gov-
ernment, however it is configured, reflects the basic values and aspi-
rations of the community.
That is to say that generic constitutionalism consists in a process
within a society by which the community commits itself to the rule of
law, specifies its basic values, and agrees to abide by a legal/institu-
tional structure which guarantees that formal social institutions will
respect the agreed-upon values.
5
The paper then discusses the importance of the development of
civil society to constitutionalism and democracy. Stan argues that broad-
based political socialization-the creation of civil society-is a prereq-
uisite to stable constitutionalism. Stated otherwise, the people "must be
educated about the idea of limited government before such a government
can succeed." 6 After analyzing the history of the idea of civil society, he
claims that by the eighteenth century the idea of civil society had split
3. Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, supra note
2, at 3, 3.
4. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an
African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD, supra note 2, at 65, 67.
5. STANLEY N. KAT-z, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: SOME NEGATIVE
LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 14 (1994).
6. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD,
supra note 2, at xx.
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into two strands. The first strand-the Lockeian notion-denoted people
living in economic activity and political freedom. Civil society repre-
sented private interests regulated by law. Indeed, Locke equated prop-
erty with citizenship. The Lockeian tradition rejected any notion of the
public good. Its sole purpose was to protect private property.
The second strand, one that defines civil society as an intermediate
sphere of voluntary association and activity standing between the indi-
vidual and the state, is the more modem notion of civil society, and the
one Stan focuses on. The idea here is that "voluntary associations fuse
personal interest and the common good."' The implications of this
strand are legion, but in whatever form, they underlie the argument that
civil society is the backbone of democracy. The concept of civil society
became useful for developing strategies to assist countries in their transi-
tion to democracy, particularly in developing the theme that there must
be space between the state and the free market. Civil society as a con-
cept became very helpful as well in defining the process by which
democratization could happen. Associational activities were said to cre-
ate and nurture the social values that produce democratic activities.
Scholars and activists argued that the existence of a strong and viable
civil society was a necessary condition for democracy. Simultaneously,
however, they argued that a vigorous civil society was a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for democracy. Indeed, the appropriate politi-
cal and legal institutions of constitutionalism are also prerequisites for
the properly functioning democracy.
In the last part of his paper, Stan asks the following question: What
is the relationship of civil society and constitutionalism? His answer is
uncertain, but he does conclude democracy requires both civil society
and constitutionalism. In his own words:
For someone who believes that constitutionalism and civil society are
both highly contested processes, it seems likely that constitutional
democracy must be the result of a long, conflicted, cultural process. I
doubt that such vibrant constitutionalism can come into existence
prior to the creation of a positive civil society, but I am also sure that
civil society alone cannot produce such a result.'
This conclusion is as far as Stan goes. He does add, however, that
for him the problem is practical not theoretical because a bright future
for the world depends upon its solutions. He suggests that "[w]e need to
do some very sophisticated history to examine different sorts of demo-
cratic societies ... to determine the ways in which constitutionalism and
civil society have coexisted and interacted, and to what degrees and in
7. Katz, supra note 1, at 296.
8. Id. at 302.
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what ways the interaction has necessarily been one of conflict."9 In this
task "[tihe challenge is ... to avoid an emphasis on political institutions
that ignores the cultural contexts within which they are embedded or a
focus on societal and cultural dynamics that ignores political contexts
(disputes and struggles)."'" The challenge is to analyze "how institu-
tional, societal, and cultural factors interact and of what kinds of out-
comes different combinations are likely to produce.""
In this paper, I take up his challenge but probably not in the way he
imagines. I do so in a more indirect way. I argue that there are many
issues to confront prior to his challenge. Indeed, these issues are part of
the process that people in various nations must confront, contest, and
perhaps resolve before a constitutional democracy can be created, even
in its most basic form.
II. A BRIEF LOOK AT HAITI
On October 15, 1994, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the first democrati-
cally elected President in the nearly 200-year history of Haiti, who had
been overthrown by a coup only months after his election, was returned
to power by approximately 20,000 American troops.' 2 A second demo-
cratically elected government took office in 1995. In 2000, Aristide ran
for and was elected President for the second time.'3 On February 29,
2004, he was once again forcibly removed from office and escorted out
of the country, this time by American forces. At that point, Canada,
France and the United States-the "three friends of Haiti"-put a pup-
pet government in power. This new de facto government presided over a
new reign of terror resulting in the murders of approximately 8000 peo-
ple and the sexual assault of 35,000 women. 14 In 2006, the Haitian peo-
ple elected a new president, but conditions have improved only
marginally."5 The attempt to "restore democracy" to Haiti-to create a
"constitutional democracy"-had failed. What happened? This paper
will describe and analyze the worldwide attempt to create constitutional
democratic regimes, using Haiti as the prime example. In the first part of
9. Id. at 303.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Gary Marx, Haitian Leader Vows to Stay; Facing a Violent Revolt, Jean-Bertrand
Aristide Promises to Protect the Nation's Fragile Democracy from Opponents He Says Are
'Terrorists,' CHI. TRIB., Feb. 14, 2004, at 1.
13. Id.
14. Athena R. Kolbe & Royce A. Hutson, Human Rights Abuse and Other Criminal
Violations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti: A Random Survey of Households, 368 LANCEr 864, 868
(2006).
15. Andrew Buncombe, Fewer Kidnappings, Improved Security-but Life Remains Harsh on
the Streets of Haiti, INDEP. (U.K.), Nov. 27, 2006, at 26.
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the paper, in a position that has particular relevance today, I will argue
that international military intervention, led by the United States, cannot
create the conditions for democracy to bloom. In reaching this conclu-
sion, I will analyze the international mechanisms the United States used
to gain legitimacy for its actions and discuss some of the problems this
raises. I will then describe and analyze the forces that hinder democracy,
and suggest a new political-economy that may promote rather than block
democratic reform.
III. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTION
October 15, 2006 marked the twelfth anniversary of the so-called
"restoration of democracy" in Haiti. 16 But the premise that an interna-
tional military force can simply and magically restore democracy to a
nation that has never experienced democracy and that lacks most of the
institutional infrastructure, material resources, and an experimental
agenda necessary to complete successfully this mission and thus to over-
come the almost impenetrable cultural, economic, political, and social
barriers of its own history, is seriously flawed, and it has serious conse-
quences for the Haitian people. This flawed idea has created expecta-
tions among Haitians and the international community that cannot be
met. Moreover, it has caused an outpouring of criticism of the efforts of
both Haitians and the international community, particularly in the United
States. 7 While the international effort can be criticized on many valid
grounds, international aid remains indispensable to Haiti's march-from
"misery to poverty with dignity" -toward democracy. In this section of
the paper, I wish to look at Haiti and ask what lessons one can learn
from the international intervention that will have more general applica-
tion to the incredible movement-the transition to democracy-that has
occurred in the past three decades all over the world:
Indeed, during the closing decades of the twentieth century, a wave
of democratization spread through most of Latin America, the Soviet
Union, and parts of Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. This movement
from dictatorship to democracy has not, of course, always run smoothly.
There have been serious internal threats to fledgling democracies,
16. See President Aristide Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at E14; Larry Rohter, Aristide
Can Speak, but Can the U.S. Hear?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at E5.
17. Haitian history rejects foreign occupation. Indeed, the history of Haiti is a response to
colonialism. The Haitian Revolution culminating in the independence of Haiti in 1804 consisted
of a war against the colonial government of France. See MICHEL-ROLPH TROUnLLOT, HAIm: STATE
AGAINST NATION: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF DUVALIERISM (1990). Haitians have a fierce
hatred of foreign occupation. There was also a rejection of the use of United States troops by
politicians and government officials in the United States when Clinton sent approximately 20,000
troops to Haiti in 1994 to restore President Aristide to power.
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retrenchments, setbacks, and counterrevolutions leading to new authori-
tarian regimes. 8 What role has and should the international community
play in this democratic drama?
Haiti is, of course, a unique case. It is a small, poor, vastly underde-
veloped nation almost abandoned over the years by its neighbors and the
world community. But Haiti is nevertheless an important example of a
nation undergoing the rigors of the transition from dictatorship to
democracy. How the international community handles questions con-
cerning Haiti thus has broader, more general implications. It suggests
methods to employ and paths to follow in future crises. Moreover, look-
ing at Haiti's difficulties and suggested solutions to them also has
broader, more general implications for the consolidation of the transition
process around the world.
The story of Haiti is, at one level, uncomplicated. In 1990, a vast
majority of the Haitian people-67.5 percent 9-elected Jean-Bertrand
Aristide President, in the first democratic election to take place in Haiti
in its nearly 200-year history as an independent state. 20 Equally impres-
sive was the election process.2 t It represented the culmination of an
extraordinary international effort to launch Haiti on the path of democ-
racy. Both the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) and the United
Nations (U.N.) played major roles in helping Haitian officials assure the
dignity of the election process.22
Within months after his installation as President, Aristide was over-
18. See generally Andres Oppenheimer, Chdvez's Authoritarian Move Was Predictable,
MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 14, 2008, at A7 (discussing the regime of Venezuelan President Hugo
ChAvez).
19. COUNCIL OF FREELY-ELECTED HEADS OF Gov'T, NAT'L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT'L
AFFAIRS, THE 1990 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN HAm 61 (1991). Aristide actually received a
substantially higher percentage of the vote. Many of the ballots in his favor, however, had to be
discounted because voters failed to mark them properly. This was due to the high illiteracy rate
among the electorate. In point of fact, virtually every one of the ballots that had to be discounted
were votes for Aristide. See Interview with Cathy Matemowska, in Miami, Fla. (Nov. 8, 1993)
(Matemowska, an anthropologist who lived in Haiti from 1985 to 1993, worked extensively with
the poor of Haiti and was an observer of the 1990 election.).
20. For a useful account of the 1990 elections in Haiti see COUNCIL OF FREELY-ELECTED
HEADS OF GOv'T, supra note 19.
21. In addition to the smooth functioning of the election process itself, voter turnout was an
astounding seventy-five percent, despite formidable logistical challenges. The dirt roads and
mountain paths of rural Haiti, where over seventy-five percent of the population lives, made the
distribution of election materials treacherous and uncertain. The high illiteracy rate among
Haitians compounded the already difficult challenges of registering and voting. Despite these
difficulties, approximately 3.2 million Haitians registered to vote and more than 2.4 million voted
on election day. Moreover, despite these logistical problems, virtually all observers who
monitored the voting, both international and domestic, attested that the elections were free and fair
and that the voters experienced no threats, intimidation, or harassment. See COUNCIL OF FREELY-
ELECTED HEADS OF GOv'T, supra note 19, at 67-71.
22. Op-Ed., Haiti Tries Again, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1990, at A24.
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thrown in a military coup and forced into exile, first in Venezuela and
then in Washington.23 The O.A.S. and U.N. immediately condemned the
coup, speaking out forcefully against the de facto regime and in support
of the democratically elected Aristide government. The international
community responded with several other unprecedented actions. Indeed,
between 1990 and 1997, the U.N. engaged in an unusually broad range
of activities in support of democracy in Haiti, including election moni-
toring,24 U.N. Security Counsel-mandated sanctions 2 5 two peacekeep-
ing operations, a naval blockade,27 and U.N. Security Council-
authorized use of force against the de facto regime.28 After several years
of failed efforts to coax the de facto government to negotiate with Aris-
tide for his return, and ostensibly because of serious human rights abuses
resulting in the murders of several thousand people and the economic
chaos created and then exacerbated by an embargo, the international
community resorted to force.
The international community's response to the military coup which
ousted Aristide is unique in at least three respects. In August 1994, the
U.N. Security Council, for the first time in its history, gave approval for
a forcible intervention in a Member State to change its government-to
restore its democratically elected government. 29 This clearly differed
from other situations in which the O.A.S. and U.N. had been involved,
such as Nicaragua and El Salvador. Unlike those cases, the stated goals
of the military intervention were neither to support democratic processes
as a means of national reconciliation nor to uphold the integrity of the
electoral process as a means of securing the fragile peace accords.
Instead, the primary and publicly proclaimed goal was simply and solely
the restoration (creation) of democratic governance. Stated otherwise,
the overriding purpose of intervention was to replace an illegitimate
regime (the de facto military government) with the legitimate regime
(the democratically elected and internationally sanctioned Aristide
government).
This was also the first time that the United States sought Security
23. PETER HALLWARD, DAMMING THE FLOOD: HAITI, ARISTIDE, AND THE POLITICS OF
CONTAINMENT, at xii (2007).
24. Jeane Kirkpatrick, A Deal for the U.N.: Reform and We'll Pay Up, BALT. SUN, Oct. 31,
1995, at 9A.
25. Terry Atlas, U.S. Lifts Most Haiti Sanctions: Curbs Remain on Military, Nation's Elite,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1994, at 1.
26. The Americas: Building a Reluctant Nation; Haiti, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10. 2007, at 55.
27. Paul Lewis, U.N. Backs Use of Ships To Enforce Haiti Embargo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
1993, at 15.
28. Larry Rohter, U.N. Force Takes Up Duties in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, at 14.
29. Julia Preston, U.N. Authorizes Invasion of Haiti; Resolution Adds Pressure on Generals,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1994, at Al.
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Council authorization for the use of force within the Western Hemi-
sphere. This is, of course, a sharp contrast from the unilateral interven-
tions by the United States in Latin America during the twentieth century,
the most recent examples being Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989).
Despite the fact that the Clinton Administration viewed the crisis in
Haiti with a growing urgency because of the increasingly large refugee
migration from Haiti to the shores of Florida between 1991 and 1994,30
the United States did not take unilateral military action. Rather, the
United States used multilateral channels to resolve the crisis. While the
use of multilateral avenues was less "efficient" than would have been
unilateral methods, the Clinton Administration correctly understood that
multilateral action offered important advantages, both domestically and
internationally.
The Haiti case is unique in one other respect: This was the first test
of the June 1991 O.A.S. Santiago Declaration on the protection of
democracy.31 Indeed, this case suggests a growing consensus among
O.A.S. Member States and internationally that the Western Hemisphere
should develop into a democratic zone free from military dictatorship.3"
Moreover, the Haiti case has been used as a precedent for the O.A.S. in
its efforts to react to threats to democracy in Peru (1992), Guatemala
(1993), and Paraguay (1996).
In 1996, after Aristide's term expired, he passed his office to the
second democratically elected President, R6ne Pr6val.33 Aristide then
ran for and was elected President for a second time in 2000."4 In 2003
and 2004, a coalition of student groups, business organizations, and
opposition politicians dissatisfied with his presidency, organized to force
him from office.35 At the same time, several loosely affiliated armed
groups, made up mostly of former soldiers from Haiti's disbanded army,
had been training in the neighboring Dominican Republic to take Haiti
30. See, e.g., Susan Martin et al., Temporary Protection: Towards a New Regional and
Domestic Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 543, 552 (1998); William E. Gibson & Lisa Ocker,
Refugee Problem Expands; Influx of Immigrants Swamps U.S. Officials, FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,
MAY 26, 1994, AT IA.
31. See The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of The Inter-American
System, O.A.S. General Assembly, 3d Plen. Sess. (adopted June 4, 1991), at 1, O.A.S. Doc OEA/
Ser.P/XXI.O.2 (1991) [hereinafter The Santiago Commitment]; Representative Democracy,
O.A.S. General Assembly, 5th Plen. Sess. (adopted June 5, 1991), AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91),
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.P/XXI.O.2 (1991).
32. No strong multilateral or regional efforts have been made to institute democracy in Cuba.
While still formally a member of O.A.S., Cuba was suspended from the organization in 1962.
33. Larry Rohter, Aristide Hands Power to Successor in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at
A 14.
34. Marx, supra note 12.
35. Id.
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over by force, occasionally conducting raids across the border.36
In early February 2004, an armed group took over the city of
Gonai'ves and declared a revolt against the government. 37 The group
took over the police station, freed prisoners from jail, and killed sus-
pected opponents.38 When the police were unable to quell this revolt, the
armed groups in the Dominican Republic crossed the border and began a
major campaign, attacking and taking cities and towns in. the north of
Haiti. Each time the insurgency attacked a city, it released all the prison-
ers held in jail, some of whom joined the fight. Often the insurgents
executed police and other officials and prominent supporters of the
elected government or Lavalas party.3 9
Many of the leaders of the armed insurgency had previously been
implicated in large-scale violence against pro-democracy activists dur-
ing the 1991-1994 de facto dictatorship. For example, Jodel Chamblain
was the second in command of the death squad for the Front for the
Advancement and Progress in Haiti (FRAPH), a paramilitary force
aligned with the former military dictatorship. Another leader of the
insurgency, Jean Pierre, alias Tatoune, was a local FRAPH leader in
Gona'ves. Both had been convicted of murder in the Raboteau massacre
trial.
On February 29, 2004, President Aristide was forced out of Haiti.4°
That day, the insurgents released thousands of prisoners from Haitian
jails.41 The insurgents and their allies conducted widespread attacks on
supporters of President Aristide and on nonpolitical innocent peasants,
which triggered an epidemic of violence. They murdered hundreds, per-
haps thousands of people. There are no reliable statistics for total deaths,
36. One of the top leaders of this group was Guy Philippe, a former soldier who had been
integrated into the police force when the army was disbanded in 1995. Mr. Philippe became a high
level police official. During his tenure, the United Nations Human Rights Mission in Haiti
asserted that officers under his command routinely executed opposition figures and accused
criminals. The United States Government accused Philippe of involvement in drug trafficking.
Philippe was eventually forced to flee when it was revealed that he was plotting to overthrow the
government. After he left Haiti, the authorities in the Dominican Republic arrested Philippe twice
for plotting coups. Eventually they released him.
37. Resistance Group Seizes City, Frees 100 Prisoners, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A4.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Haitian Rebels Bring in Reinforcements, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, Feb. 14,
2004, at A 18; Ian James, Effort To Oust Aristide Intensifies in Haiti, DESERET MORNING NEWS
(Salt Lake City), Feb. 15, 2004, at A04; Reed Lindsay, Gathering Storm; Gang Holding City in
Haiti Allies with Former Military, Paramilitary Chiefs, NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 2004, at A6.
40. Lydia Polgreen & Tim Weiner, Haiti President Forced Out; Marines Sent To Keep
Order, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at Al.
41. Matthew Hay Brown, U.S. Leads Forces to Haiti-Power Vacuum: Aristide Flees Island
Amid Rebellion, Pressure; Help on Way: 100 Marines Spearhead U.N.-Authorized Mission;
Violence Sweeps Port-au-Prince in Wake of Leader's Hasty Departure, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar.
1, 2004, at Al.
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but the state morgue reported disposing of over 1000 bodies in the
month of March 2004 alone.42 Many of the bodies showed the signs of
summary execution. Recently, a study 43 published in the prestigious
British Journal, Lancet, reported that in the twenty-two month period
after the departure of Aristide, approximately 8000 people were killed in
political violence in Port-au-Prince alone.' Other human rights organi-
zations estimate that perhaps 4000 people have been killed.45 Many
others have been arrested illegally by the police or by unaccountable
paramilitary groups, and have been tortured. Thousands, and perhaps
tens of thousands, have been forced to flee abroad or into internal exile.
Many have been kidnapped and held for ransom.
Beginning in August 2004, the paramilitary forces set up command
posts all over Haiti. This illegal group then openly announced the refor-
mation of the Haitian army and brazenly marched in the streets of Port-
au-Prince brandishing automatic weapons. These acts were, of course,
clearly illegal. While the United Nations forces have successfully
removed some of the paramilitary forces from their command posts,
most units still maintain control over their command posts. Unfortu-
nately, these paramilitary forces continue to operate with impunity and
control many areas of the country.
The "three friends of Haiti"-Canada, France, and the United
States-put in a puppet government to replace the democratically
elected Aristide government. The United Nations sent another
peacekeeping force of thousands of soldiers. Violence escalated even
further. Corruption increased, the rule of law became a distant memory,
and a civil war erupted pitting the de facto government and the U.N.
peacekeeping force against the ghetto gangs.46
Unfortunately, political violence in Haiti does not show any signs
of subsiding. Although it tapered off some in the months following the
February 2004 coup d'etat, it peaked again from September 2004
through September 2005, and rose precipitously until the election of
Prrval in 2006. 47
42. INST. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN HAITI:
FEBRUARY-MAY 2004 (2004), http://www.haitiaction.net/News/IJDH/7194.html.
43. See Kolbe & Hutson, supra note 14. Violence in Haiti between 2004 and 2006 has also
been well-documented by Amnesty International, teams from Harvard and the University of
Miami Law Schools, Refugees International, the Committee to Protect Journalists and the
International Crisis Group, among others. While some of the violence in Haiti is non-political, all
of the reports identify perceived engagement in political activity as a significant risk factor for
becoming a victim of violence.
44. Id. at 868.
45. Interview by Darren Ell with Peter Hallward, in Montreal, Que., Can. (May 14, 2008).
46. Letta Tayler, Haiti A Place of Fear and Havoc, NEWSDAY, Jan. 1, 2006, at 04.
47. See Jacqueline Charles, Congress Is Asked To Let Haitians Stay: Rep. Alcee Hastings Is
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The institutions that should protect citizens from political violence
have shown no capacity to do so. After the interim government assumed
power, highly placed government officials sharply reduced the Haitian
police force by firing many officers considered loyal to the ousted gov-
ernment.48 In addition, the insurgents killed many other police officers,
further reducing the police force. The interim government replaced the
purged officers with former soldiers, many of whom had participated in
the rebellion and many of whom were either convicted or accused of
being involved in massive human crimes in the past, including
thousands of murders.49 This replacement action violated police regula-
tions for recruitment and promotion. It also swelled the force with a
large number of officers with no civilian police experience or training.
These officers have never been held accountable to the official police
hierarchy for violating the laws or police regulations. It appears they
never will be.
The police force has also openly contributed to repression through
illegal arrests, shooting at people involved in legal demonstrations, and
even killing suspected political dissidents.5° Some sources estimate that
over 1000 political prisoners sit in Haiti's jails, the vast majority of
whom have never been brought before a judge.51 In some cases, the
official reasons for the arrest listed in the file are "suspected association
with the former regime."
Police have opened fire at crowds at several recent demonstrations.
The most notable incident took place on February 28, 2005, when police
shot into a crowd and killed a number of innocent people. 52 United
Nations Peacekeepers, human rights workers, and the international
media observed this "police riot." Nevertheless, the interim government
did not prosecute or even discipline any of these officers for these
murders.53
Seeking an 18-month Reprieve for Haitians Living in this Country Illegally, So They Can Stay and
Work Legally, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 19, 2007, at 10A.
48. Letta Tayler, Haiti No Law, No Order, NEWSDAY, Jan. 1, 2006, at 07.
49. Interview with Brian Concannon, Jr., Dir., Inst. for Justice & Democracy, in Wash. D.C.
(May 10, 2005).
50. Id.
51. Judith Scherr, Justice Skewed in Haiti, BERKLEY DAILY PLANET, Sept. 23, 2005, available
at http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2005-09-23/article/22376.
52. Peter Prengaman, Police Fire on Marchers Supporting Aristide, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Mar. 1, 2005, at A6.
53. Interview with Mario Joseph, Attorney, Bureau des Avocats Intemationaux, in Wash.,
D.C. (May 10, 2005). The Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAT) in Port-au-Prince, has helped
victims prosecute human rights cases, trained Haitian lawyers and spoken out on justice issues
since 1995. The BAT used to receive most of its support from Haiti's constitutional governments,
but since February 2004, it has received most of its support from the Institute for Justice &
Democracy in Haiti (IJDH), and no support from any government or political organization. See
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Haitian police routinely shoot and kill young men and women
accused of being dissidents. Although the police and even the United
Nations have announced several inquiries into these killings,54 I do not
know of a single officer disciplined for these murders.
Some of the Haitian police officers and former military members
have formed criminal gangs-murdering, kidnapping, and robbing inno-
cent people. Any attempt to prosecute them has led to the death and
disappearance of the accusers and witnesses.
Haiti's justice system does not provide protection for people
targeted for persecution." The rule of law is a sad joke. Those who
complain of crimes by gang members are virtually never protected by
the police. Indeed, some of the police, who are themselves gang mem-
bers, target these victims for death or imprisonment on trumped-up
charges. In most prisoner cases, the victim is denied access to a judge, or
is only brought before a judge without the authority to release the pris-
oner. For example, in July 2004, a judge announced in court that he
found no justification for the detention of Jacques Mathelier, a former
government official, but gave the prosecutor time to respond. The
authorities responded by transferring Mathelier outside the judge's juris-
diction to the National Penitentiary, where he remained as of the end of
June 2005.56 Jean-Marie Samedi, a grassroots activist, was ordered
released by a judge on November 22, 2004, but the government simply
ignored that order. 7 (Samedi later escaped from prison.) In December
2004, a judge ordered two former government officials, Harold S6v~re
and Anthony Nazaire, who had already spent ten months in prison, freed
for lack of evidence. 8 Although the prosecutor approved the release, the
INST. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, THE BUREAU DES ADVOCATS INTERNATIONAUX, http://
www.ijdh.org/articles/article bureauintemationaux.htm.
54. Interview with Brian Concannon, Jr., supra note 49; see also Brian Concannon, Jr.,
Throwing Gasoline on Haiti's Fires, BOSTON HAITIAN REP., July 2005, at 8, available at http://
www.ijdh.org/articles/article recentnews_7-7-05.htm.
55. Interview with Brian Concannon, Jr., supra note 49; see also ORG. OF AM. STATES INTER-
AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HAITI: FAILED JUSTICE OR THE RULE OF LAW? CHALLENGES
AHEAD FOR HAM AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (2005), available at http://reliefweb.int/
rw/RWFiles2006.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/LSGZ-6N4DQM-oas-hti-I 6mar.pdf/$File/
oas-hti- 16mar.pdf.
56. Interview with Brian Concannon, Jr., supra note 49; see also Brian Concannon, Jr.,
Disturbing the Peace, BOSTON HAMAN REP., Nov. 2004, at 10, available at http://www.ijdh.org/
articles/article-disturbing-the-peace.html.
57. See INST. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, JEAN-MARIE SAMEDI, http://
www.ijdh.org/articles/article-jean-marie-samedi.htm; see also Aff. of Mario Joseph in Support of
Contention that Domestic Remedies in Haiti Are Not Available for Petitioner, Inter-Am. Comm'n
on Human Rights, Pet. of Yvon Neptune, available at http://www.ijdh.org/pdf/Declarationof
MarioJosephAvENU.pdf.
58. Lyn Duff, Three Political Prisoners Freed in Haiti, S.F. BAY VIEW, Apr. 20, 2006,
available at http://ijdh.org/pdf/RoundupApril15-242006.pdf (located on page 35 of the file).
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Minister of Justice issued an illegal order for them to remain in prison,
and both remained in prison as of December 2006." 9
Government officials arrested Father G6rard Jean-Juste, a Catholic
priest, in October 2004 without warrant, and dragged him from his
church where he was serving hundreds of children their only meal of the
day.6" Although the Haitian Constitution entitles detainees to a hearing
within forty-eight hours, Father Jean-Juste spent seven weeks in prison
with no evidence ever presented against him before being freed for lack
of evidence. On July 15, 2005, police again arrested Father Jean-Juste at
the airport on the basis of unsubstantiated charges. 6' They temporarily
released him, but required him to return for more questioning. Later,
they arrested him again and imprisoned him on trumped-up charges.
After he spent several more months in jail, and after a firestorm of inter-
national criticism, the interim government allowed him to go to Miami
to be treated for cancer.62
Judges are under significant pressure not to release prisoners,
regardless of the evidence against them. In July 2004, ANAMAH, the
national judge's association, issued a press release condemning execu-
tive interference in judicial matters."63 In December, the Minister of Jus-
tice personally wrote to the Chief Judge of the Port-au-Prince Trial
Court, ordering him to take all the cases away from Judge Fleury, who
had ordered Father Jean-Juste's release. 64 The Minister of Justice also
ordered the Chief Judge to take all the cases away from Judge Fabien,
who had ordered the release of four other people who had spent ten
months in jail on trumped-up charges.65 One of the judges resigned in
59. See id.
60. Haiti Human Rights Alert: Illegal Arrest of Catholic Priest, Rev. Girard Jean-Juste, INST.
FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, Oct. 18, 2004, http://www.ijdh.org/articles/article-human_
fights-alertoctl304.htm.
61. Letter from Maxine Waters, U.S. Rep., to James Foley, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti (July
15, 2005), available at http://www.ijdh.org/articles/article-jean-juste-letter.htm.
62. Alva James-Johnson, A Long Road for Priest; In Broward, Rev. Jean-Juste Finds Relative
Obscurity a Blessing, FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 4, 2006, at lB.
63. Irwin P. Stotzky, Introduction to ANNA MANCE ET AL., HAmI: HUMAN RIGHTS
INVESTIGATION: MARCH 11-16 2006, at 6 (Ctr. for the Study of Human Rights, Univ. of Miami
School of Law 2006); New Haitian Human Rights Report: Miami Law School Investigates UN
"Failures," HAITiACTION.NET, July 22, 2006, http://www.haitiaction.net/News/CSHR/7_22_6/
7_22_6.html.
64. Aff. of Mario Joseph in Support of Contention that Domestic Remedies in Haiti Are Not
Available for Petitioners, Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, Pet. of Haiti Citizens Against the
Interim Gov't of Haiti, the United States, and Brazil, available at http://www.ijdh.org/articles/
articleiachr_2-2-06d.htm.
65. Memorandum from Maren Dobberthien, Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, Mario
Joseph, Bureau des Avocats Intemationaux, Brian Concannon Jr., Inst. for Justice & Democracy
in Haiti to December 5 Case File (Apr. 21, 2006), available at http://www.ijdh.org/articles/
articlerecentnews_4-24-06.html.
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protest. These orders are as illegal in Haiti as they are in the United
States.
Neither the police nor the judiciary effectively investigate or prose-
cute killings. Although the government has made arrests in some high
profile incidents, in most cases these arrests were illegal, and no evi-
dence has been presented against the accused. As a result, the justice
system provides almost no deterrence to would-be political killers.
The press is not able to monitor the police effectively. As the Com-
mittee to Protect Journalists and others have documented, attacks against
journalists by private groups and the government have sent many jour-
nalists into hiding, and silenced others.66 In mid-January 2005, the
police executed Abdias Jean, a journalist with a Florida radio station,
after he witnessed police execute two men.6 7 Several press organizations
and even UNESCO denounced this killing. "In another notorious inci-
dent in January 2005, Prime Minister Gerard Latortue threatened jour-
nalist Guy Delva, the correspondent for Reuters in Haiti and the head of
the Haitian Journalists Association."68 Journalists who criticize the
insurgents, the gangs, the police, and the government have been
threatened, beaten, even kidnapped.
An unprecedented level of violent non political crime accompanied
Haiti's political violence, especially between 2005 and 2006. There has
been a wave of murders, kidnappings, beatings, and robberies, which the
police have proven powerless to combat. The common crime has two
connections with the political violence. First, in some cases it is con-
ducted by groups that originally armed themselves for political reasons
and then became gangs involved in robberies and drug running. Second,
the common crime can be a convenient cover for the political crime. It
would be easy to arrange for a political opponent or witness to be killed
and simply disguise it as an ordinary murder.
The recent national elections, including the presidential election,
were postponed several times. 69 They were originally scheduled for
October, then rescheduled for November and then December 2005, and
then rescheduled again for January 2006.70 The election finally took
66. See Brian Concannon Jr., Dir. of Inst. for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, Inter-Am.
Comm'n on Human Rights, General Situation of Human Rights in Haiti Hearing (Mar. 4, 2005),
available at http://www.ijdh.org/brian.pdf.
67. Id.
68. New Haitian Human Rights Report: Miami Law School Investigates UN "Failures,"
supra note 63.
69. Kathie Klarreich, Kidnapping an Election; With Gangs Rampant in the Streets,
Democracy in Haiti Takes a Backseat to Chaos and Insecurity, TIME, Jan. 9, 2006, at 38.
70. See Danna Harman, Haiti Heads to Polls... at Lost, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 7,
2006, at 1.
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place in February 2006."' On February 7, 2006, the people of Haiti
elected Rfne Prfval as their next President.72
Haiti's elections caused an increase in political violence. Many
people, especially supporters of the ousted government, opposed having
elections at all.7 3 Those who participated, especially the former military
people and gang members, did everything they could to prevail, includ-
ing murdering any common citizen whom they perceived as being
opposed to their candidate or to the corruption of the system itself. The
police and gang members used the elections as a front to murder wit-
nesses to their ,rimes.
President Prfval's inauguration took place on May 14, 2006.7' A
new government took office on June 6, 2006."5 These positive develop-
ments suggested that human rights and security conditions in Haiti
would improve. This, however, has not been the case. Indeed, the situa-
tion continues to deteriorate.
Between 2004 and 2006, during the Latortue reign, untold numbers
of innocent Haitians have been summarily executed, arbitrarily thrown
into prison, tortured or driven into hiding. The political violence is wide-
spread, systematic, and targeted against the urban and rural poor sus-
pected of being opposed to the present regime and its affiliates.
Perpetrators of this violence include the Haitian National Police and
death squad elements, such as gang members, working with the police.
The violence continued, indeed increased, particularly between 2005 and
2006.76 Kidnappings of those considered "wealthy" by the gang mem-
bers, particularly Americans, have increased exponentially. 77 According
to the FBI, at least twenty-eight Americans were kidnapped and three
killed in attempted abductions in 2005 alone.78 Haiti has replaced
71. Id.
72. Richard Dufour & Keith Jones, Washington Reluctantly Concedes Prival Is Haiti's
President-Elect, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SrIE, Feb. 21, 2006, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/
feb2006/hait-f2 I.shtml.
73. One of the reasons they opposed the elections was because they feared losing their
monopolies on power.
74. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Prdval Sworn in as Haiti's President; Returning Leader Urges
Citizens To Nurture Peace in Restored Democracy, WASH. POST, May 15, 2006, at A10.
75. Brian Concannon Jr., Haiti's Political Prisoners Exemplify Challenges of Democratic
Transition, POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REPORT, Sept. 11, 2006, http://www.pinr.com/
report.php?ac=view.report&report id=552.
76. See Reed Lindsay, Haiti's Image of Fear 'A Big Myth' to Some; Tourists, Foreign
Investors Keep Their Distance, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A12.
77. See, e.g., Spotlight: Haiti-Kidnapping Criminal or Political?-Calm Threatened by
Recent Crime Surge, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, July 23, 2006, at A8; Carol J. Williams, The
World; Wave of Kidnappings Heightens Sense of Terror in Haitian Capital, L.A. TIMES, June 29,
2005, at 4.
78. Joe Mozingo, Abductions for Ransom Soar in Haiti, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 7, 2005, at IA.
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Colombia as the kidnapping capital of the hemisphere.79 Anyone who is
perceived by the gangs as having any money, such as a criminal
deportee from the United States, is at great risk of being kidnapped and
held for ransom.
The increased violence will likely continue for several reasons.
First, the people involved in the past persecution remain at large. The
interim government or the rebels freed every person imprisoned under
the democratic governments in connection with human rights violations.
At least two people with credible accusations of large-scale persecution
against them ran as Presidential candidates in the February 2004 elec-
tions: rebel leader and former soldier, Guy Philippe, and Franck
Romain, a Duvalierist and former mayor of Port-au-Prince who spent
sixteen years in exile fleeing formal charges that he masterminded the
1987 massacre at the St. Jean Bosco church.80 The only major arrest for
human rights violations committed under the interim government was
for the August 2005 soccer massacre, and government officials were
freed on March 9, 2006.81 In the lead-up to the February elections, Presi-
dent Prrval had to cancel many of his campaign appearances, including
his final rally, because his opponents threatened violent demonstrations
if he appeared. Although redemocratizing the police and justice systems
may eventually create a deterrent to political persecution, with current
personnel it is unlikely that the police will make serious efforts to pro-
tect people from political violence in the near term. Between July 4 and
July 7, 2006, paramilitary attacks on the Grande Ravine neighborhood
left twenty people dead.82 No arrests, to my knowledge, ever occurred
for those attacks.
Second, although the police technically answer to constitutional
authorities, it is unlikely that the constitutional authorities will be able to
purge the former soldiers that the interim government illegally inte-
grated into police ranks. These officers have engaged in a disproportion-
ate amount of brutality and political persecution, and it is likely that they
will continue to do so until they are purged. The police force is sharply
reduced already while common crime is very high, so the government
will be reluctant to fire more police officers, even brutal or crooked
ones. The supporters of the integrated officers in the force, and in influ-
ential sectors of society at large, will fight any purge, and the new gov-
79. Id.
80. Haiti: Thirst for Justice: A Decade of Impunity in Haiti, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Sept.
1996, http://hrw.org/reports/1996/Haiti.htm.
81. Reed Lindsay, Gang Killings May Be Political; 21 Slain in Slum; Gunmen Likely Tried
To Destabilize Government, WASH. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A15.
82. Dave Welsh, Thousands March in Haiti Demanding End to Reign of Terror,
HArrtAcrION.NET, http://www.haitiaction.net/News/HAC/0l 014_6/10_14_6.html.
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ernment will be reminded that the same people played a key role in
removing Haiti's last constitutional government.
Third, the judges and prosecutors who participated in the justice
system's repression under the interim government are still in their posi-
tions, and still engaging in persecution. After more than two and a half
years in office, the elected government has shown little ability to stop
this persecution. Indeed, almost all of the political prisoners and criminal
deportees remain incarcerated.
Fourth, the precedent set in February 2004-where political vio-
lence overthrew an elected government-will encourage those left out
of the government to seek power through violence. If they do, they will
likely start by murdering innocent people. Haiti finds itself in almost as
bad a condition as before the first election of Aristide in 1990, when the
Duvaliers still ruled. Indeed, between 2004 and 2006, Haiti was a news-
reel in reverse-foreign occupation, a repressive, corrupt government,
and rampant, unchecked political violence.
The international effort continues. The attempt to help Haiti create
the necessary infrastructure for democracy to develop-economically,
politically, and socially-however, has not been as successful as the
original military intervention. Unfortunately, the results of the outside
world's intervention in Haiti may well prove unsuccessful and imperma-
nent in a way that Graham Greene83 would have well understood. Nev-
ertheless, the questions that the Haiti case raises are surprisingly
numerous and important. For example, is democracy so widely accepted
as an international norm, at least in the Western Hemisphere, that the
international community has a right, indeed even a duty, to restore it
when it is forcibly overthrown by a military coup and whose de facto
government has committed gross human rights violations, trampled on
the rights of the people, and caused massive refugee flows? If so, what
particular bodies can legitimately (and legally) exercise such a right of
intervention? Can an outside military intervention and then a peacekeep-
ing mission create the conditions for democracy to develop and help to
secure it?
Before analyzing some of these issues, several preliminary observa-
tions seem relevant. They color the horizon and add perspective to the
analysis. The first is the role of the United States, and the decision to use
force. The United States took a very long time and a circuitous path to
decide to use force. Indeed, it is not the case that the United States was
intent on intervening militarily in Haiti from the beginning of the crisis
and originally planned on using the O.A.S. and the U.N. as institutional
83. See generally GRAHAM GREENE, THE COMEDIANS (1966) (depicting such failure during
the Duvalier reign of terror).
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structures in which to implement and legitimize its military plans.84
In point of fact, as the Haitian crisis developed, it was not at all
clear what the Clinton Administration intended to do in Haiti. Clinton
appeared first to favor negotiations, then economic sanctions, and later a
naval blockade to force the coup leaders out. Mysteriously, Clinton's
position vacillated almost daily. It was only after several years of incon-
sistent approaches and actions by the United States, including the forced
repatriation of thousands of Haitian refugees, coupled with severe
domestic criticism of his actions by the Congressional Black Caucus,
human rights organizations and other groups, and the skilled work of
Aristide in exerting domestic and international pressures on Clinton, that
Clinton decided to use force. In retrospect, it now seems self-evident
that only the threat or the use of force would dislodge the de facto
regime from Haiti. But this was not so obvious to those involved, and
there was certainly no strong United States interest in taking military
action.
It is irrefutable that the decision to use force was reached late and
somewhat chaotically, through the vagaries and uncertainties of the
American domestic political process. The Clinton Administration
employed the U.N. framework to legitimize military action only after the
United States concluded that force was absolutely necessary to restore
the Aristide government to power.85 Security Council resolution 940
gave authority for "all necessary means"-meaning the use of military
force-to be used.86 This, of course, helped to legitimize military action
in a divided and skeptical United States.
A second, and perhaps a contentious observation, is that one of the
main catalysts-if not the main catalyst-for United States intervention
in Haiti was the migration to the shores of South Florida of vast numbers
of Haitian refugees who were seeking asylum in the United States. As a
result of the 1991 military coup and President Aristide's ouster from
power, thousands of Haitians seeking asylum departed Haiti by boat and
attempted to reach the United States.87 Between 1992 and 1994, the
84. Both because of domestic and international pressure, President Clinton realized that the
use of force should be a last resort. Indeed, domestically, Clinton did not want to adhere to the
War Powers Resolution for a variety of reasons, including getting into a public battle with
members of Congress opposed to using military force to return Aristide to power. See John J.
Kavanagh, U.S. War Powers and the United Nations Security Council, 20 B.C. ITr'L & COMP. L.
REV. 159, 180-82 (1997).
85. See Tom Squitieri, U.S. Studies Haiti Invasion/Military Action Would Return Ousted
President, USA TODAY, May 2, 1994, at IA. Senator Bob Graham, a vocal proponent of more
drastic change, firmly believed that economic sanctions would not work, and advocated invasion.
Susan Benesch, Graham: Be Ready for Haiti Invasion, MIAMI HERALD, June 20, 1994, at A8.
86. S.C. Res. 940, 4, U.N. Doc. SIRES/940 (July 31, 1994).
87. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 163 (1993).
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United States Coast Guard interdicted Haitians bound for the United
States on the high seas and returned them directly to Haiti.88 This action
was taken in direct violation of an agreement between the Haitian and
United States governments and in violation of international law. Many
of those who were returned to Haiti faced persecution from the de facto
government. The inflow of refugees increasingly became a politically
sensitive issue, and it was in response to domestic political pressure to
take action to stem the tide of boat people that the Clinton Administra-
tion pushed for an internationally sponsored intervention in Haiti. Clin-
ton feared that the spectacle of thousands of poor, black Haitians
washing up on Florida's shores would harm his presidential reelection
campaign.89 He particularly feared that he would lose votes in Florida, a
pivotal state in his reelection strategy. 90 Stated otherwise, the major rea-
son for the United States led intervention was the flow of refugees to the
United States and Clinton's fear of losing vital votes because of it. Every
other issue, including the murders of 5000 people, took a back seat to
that reason. It is likely that the Clinton Administration hoped that if
democracy could be "restored" to Haiti, perhaps the flow of refugees
would cease. The fear of Haitian boat people continues to be a strong
incentive for United States aid to Haiti.
A third observation, and quite a troubling one, is also irrefutable.
Particular elements of the United States government encouraged the
intransigence of the military coup leaders and thus needlessly prolonged
the crisis, with dire consequences for the Haitian people. Select mem-
bers of Congress and the defense establishment, most notably officials
of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.), the Pentagon, and the State
Department, continued to assure the coup leaders, in subtle and not so
subtle ways, that the United States actually supported the de facto mili-
tary government and not the democratically elected Aristide govern-
ment.91 The de facto military leaders simply did not believe that the
United States and the international community would ever take military
action to restore Aristide to power. The coup leaders, therefore, placated
the international community by pretending to negotiate with the Aristide
government in good faith, all the while hoping to prolong the return of
Aristide until his official term in office had ended.
88. Intense litigation ensued over these actions. See, e.g., id.; Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v.
Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11 th Cir. 1992).
89. Randy Lilleston, DLj Vufor Clinton, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZET, July 10, 1994, at 13A.
90. Id.
91. See IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GuNs IN HAI: THE PROMISE OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 30-41, 166-76 (1997); Susan Benesch, Haitian Army Trades Truncheons for
Trumpets, MIAMI HERALD, June 12, 1995, at IA; Larry Rohter, Aristide Weakens Army and Makes
It Dependent on Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at 8.
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In addition to encouraging the coup leaders not to compromise with
the Aristide government, the United States government officials opposed
to Aristide orchestrated a campaign to smear Aristide's public image.
Early in Aristide's exile, for example, the C.I.A. distributed a false
report that branded Aristide as mentally unstable, claiming that he had
spent time in a mental hospital in Canada.9" The C.I.A. also spread a
false rumor that Aristide and his cohorts committed political assassina-
tions.93 Senator Jesse Helms, who has always had reservations about
Aristide and attempted to undermine President Clinton's goal of restor-
ing Aristide to power, basing his conclusions on the C.I.A. report,
referred to Aristide as a "psychopath" and a "demonstrable killer."94 The
report was a sham. The Cable News Network (C.N.N.) found no report
of Aristide being treated for mental depression or any other problem in
Canada, and the report was revealed to be based on unconfirmed infor-
mation supplied by the very people who overthrew Aristide.95 The
C.I.A. admitted that it had been paying individuals in the Haitian mili-
tary leadership for this and other kinds of information since the early
1980s. 96 These, and other actions97 taken by those United States officials
opposed to Aristide's return, clearly continue to cause problems for the
creation of democracy in Haiti.
A fourth important observation is also a somewhat touchy and
speculative one. It is whether there was an implicit or explicit agreement
among the five permanent members (the Permanent Five)98 of the U.N.
Security Council. While there is no direct proof of this, there has been a
great deal of speculation that horse trading took place to allow the mili-
tary intervention in Haiti. The speculation suggests that in exchange for
a free hand in Haiti, including the use of force, the United States agreed
92. STOTZKY, supra note 91, at 45 n.39 (citing Elaine Sciolino, Haiti's Man of Destiny
Awaiting His Hour; Haiti's Man of Destiny Awaits Transition from Political Martyr to Statesman,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1993, at Al).
93. Irwin P. Stotzky, Democracy and International Military Intervention: The Case of Haiti,
in DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA 125, 130 (Richard S. Hillman et al. eds.,
2001).
94. Id.
95. U.S. Rejects Document on Aristide's Health, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at L12.
96. See Tim Weiner, Key Haiti Leaders Said To Have Been in the C.LA. 's Pay; Aristide Aides
Angered, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1993, at Al.
97. These sources continued to spread false and unsubstantiated information about Aristide
and his government after Aristide had been reinstated. The worst of these rumors suggested that
Aristide and his associates were involved in numerous political murders. The accusations continue
through today. Even in exile after his forced ouster from office in 2004, Aristide is now being
portrayed as the power behind the throne, a murderer, and either a drug dealer or a leader who gets
paid off by drug dealers. For a discussion of these and other issues about the opposition to the
Aristide and Pr6val governments in the United States, see STOTZKY, supra note 91.
98. The Permanent Five includes China, France, the Soviet Union (now Russia), the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
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that other members of the Security Council could have a similarly free
hand in their areas of influence. For example, Russia wanted autonomy
to deal with Georgia and Tajikistan, and believed that France and the
United States owed it such a free hand in exchange for its support of
French action in Rwanda and United States action in Haiti. In reading
the discussions of the Security Council during this period, there certainly
appears to be an acceptance by the Permanent Five that actions taken in
their regions of interest would be tolerated by the other Security Council
members. To put it another way, national political concerns rather than
deep moral principles seem to have played the most crucial role in the
use of force in Haiti.
One final observation. In many parts of the world, particularly in
Latin America and the Caribbean, including Haiti itself, there was and
remains a deep suspicion of United States military intervention,99 and
with good reason. Such intervention in the past invariably had question-
able purposes and results. It was almost always used to support rather
than to overthrow authoritarian regimes and to support United States
commercial interests. The 1915-1934 United States occupation of Haiti
is a prime example."' ° One result of this history was that the O.A.S.,
while struggling valiantly to do the right thing about Haiti, was not able
to do everything necessary to restore democracy. The U.N. Security
Council was better situated and able to make the difficult decisions than
was the O.A.S., the principal regional body. Employing the U.N. Secur-
ity Council as authority for the intervention also offered the Clinton
Administration an important moral force. Most importantly, the U.N.
approval of the use of force limited the international and domestic oppo-
sition to the United States-led action. 10 1
There were other advantages to U.N. approval. The coalition-build-
ing role that the United States had to assume, to get international support
through the Security Council for the intervention in Haiti, was critically
important. It helped shape United States methods and goals in Haiti, and
for the better. Moreover, the fact that the United States did put together
an internationally accepted policy on Haiti suggests broader conse-
quences for the methods employed to justify the use of force in the
future. Unilateral military action by the United States has certainly
become more difficult to justify after the internationally sanctioned mili-
tary intervention in Haiti.
99. Iraq, of course, makes the point even stronger.
100. For a discussion and analysis of the United States occupation of Haiti see HANS SCHMIDT,
THEm UNITED STATES OCCUPATION OF HAITI, 1915-1934 (1971).
101. Pamela Constable, U.S., Others Condemn Haiti for Expulsions; Opposition to an Invasion
Lessens, BOSTON GLOBE, July 13, 1994, at 8; Lucia Mouat, As UN Council Weighs US Invasion of
Haiti, All Eyes on the Junta, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 25, 1994, at 1.
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These observations put into context the underlying, but perhaps
well-hidden, reasons for the intervention. They show the role of power
in the resolution of international legal issues. They act as filters on the
possibilities of future international interventions. On a broader level,
they also help keep the focus on the possible transformative resolutions
to some of the incredibly difficult problems facing nations undergoing
the transition process.
A note of caution. The issues involved are highly complex, layered,
and ever changing. Every nation has its own peculiar culture, history,
social structure, and economy. Thus, every case is, in some sense, sui
generis. Nonetheless, broad patterns can be discerned and generaliza-
tions can be made that are quite helpful in analyzing the transition pro-
cess and the possibilities of developing strong democracies in former
authoritarian nations.
What are the implications of these observations? Suppose the
United States decides to use military force to "restore democracy" to
Colombia, Ecuador, or Venezuela. °2 Is Haiti a precedent for a future
legal and legitimate humanitarian intervention in other states? Indeed,
Security Council mandated use of force in support of democracy in Haiti
will surely be cited as a precedent for similar action in some other coun-
try. But too much should not be made of the Haiti case, and certainly not
a new international legal doctrine. The decision to use force to restore
Aristide to power came about only after many other approaches over a
three-year period failed, including a series of economic sanctions,
attempted negotiations, and a naval blockade,"0 3 so that its ground
breaking nature is less compelling as a precedent than it might otherwise
be. Moreover, the Security Council's decision to use force was driven
almost exclusively by the national interests of the United States, particu-
larly President Clinton's fear that Haitian refugee migration to the shores
of South Florida would upset his reelection strategy and cause him to
lose Florida, and thus the presidency. Furthermore, the anticipated effec-
tive military opposition from Haiti was virtually nonexistent. Even more
significant is another unique situation. The democratically elected head
102. This is not such a far-fetched possibility. Colombia, for example, presents serious
concerns for its neighbors. Its two most consuming problems-the drug trade, and a brutal, nearly
forty year civil war-are getting worse. They increasingly threaten neighboring countries.
Venezuela, one of the largest suppliers of oil to the United States, is seen as particularly
vulnerable. But now that Chavez has taken power, perhaps it is less vulnerable. The Clinton
Administration unveiled a $1.3 billion dollar plan to help Colombia, which included $955 million
dollars in security assistance. The plan risked dragging the United States into a costly counter-
insurgency war and close alliance with Colombia's military forces. See Editorial, Dangerous
Plans for Colombia, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 13, 2000, at WKI6; see also David Adams, Colombia Aid
Gets New Scrutiny, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 4, 2007, at 10A.
103. STOTZKY, supra note 91, at 30-41.
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of government essentially authorized these steps in exile. In addition, a
strong regional interest existed in reversing the coup against Aristide,
both because of the refugee flows from Haiti and because of the fear that
the military forces in other emerging democracies would be encouraged
by the intransigence of the Haitian coup leaders. All of these conditions
were singular.
Moreover, world events since that time suggest a cautious approach
in the use of Haiti as a precedent for the use of multinational military
interventions all over the world. For example, the palace coup in Cam-
bodia in which the second Prime Minister effectively removed the first
Prime Minister in July 199714 provoked no serious talk at the U.N. of
military intervention. This is so even though the U.N. had played an
instrumental role in the Cambodian elections leading to the creation of
the first Prime Minister's government. 10 5 Further, the commission of
massive human rights abuses in other nations after the Haiti experience
simply did not lead to multinational military intervention. For example,
human-rights abuses in East Timor, Afghanistan, °6 and Algeria have
not brought military intervention by the international community for a
variety of reasons, including historical and regional factors, economic
interests, the causes of the violations, the scale of the problem, and the
perceived cost of the remedy. (The U.S. invaded Iraq, of course, without
the sanction of the U.N.)
But the Haiti case is a precedent in several ways. Never before had
the Security Council authorized force to remove a de facto government
and reinstate a democratic one within a Member State. Never before had
the international community used force to restore a democratically
elected president and replace the very coup leaders who had overthrown
him. If the United States wishes to act multilaterally again in the West-
ern Hemisphere, its approach to Haiti should act as an important prece-
dent. There is a caveat to offer, however. The circumstances of the Haiti
case were unique, particularly in the domestic politics of the United
States, and unlikely to be replicated.
There are, nonetheless, some important lessons to be learned from
the Haiti crisis and the intervention that may be suggestive for future
crises. To begin with, military enforcement of economic sanctions
imposed on a state as a means for preventing repression can itself have
serious effects on the well-being of the nationals of that country. The
104. See Tom Fawthrop, Prince Removed by Hun Sen in Cambodia Coup, TIMES (London),
July 7, 1997, at 13; Keith B. Richburg, Hun Sen Gains Prominent Ally; Ousted Cambodian
Prince's Foreign Minister Named Co-Premier, WASH. POST, July 17, 1997, at A25.
105. See Fawthrop, supra note 104.
106. There were other reasons, of course, for the use of military force in Afghanistan.
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sanctions imposed on Haiti created considerable hardships on the very
people (the Haitian people) who were meant to be helped. This resulted
in or at least aggravated serious problems of malnutrition, deteriorating
health care, and hunger that approached starvation. The sanctions also
harmed the ability of hospitals and relief organizations to function
because of the lack of fuel. In addition, the international community
withheld supplies from the de facto regime to put added pressure on
it.' °7 In turn, the de facto leaders withheld supplies from the Haitian
people to place pressure on the international community. At the same
time, Haiti's military leaders and the economic elite avoided economic
hardships by smuggling supplies for themselves across the porous bor-
der with the Dominican Republic." °8 The de facto military government
actually thrived on the embargo and other economic sanctions by taking
over the drug trafficking business.' 09 Context is crucial. Economic sanc-
tions are effective only if the rational economic maximizer (here the de
facto regime) perceives that it will be harmed.
Second, the interplay between the U.N., the O.A.S., and the United
States was a significant element of the intervention. It led to sanctions,
forced negotiations and, eventually, military intervention. But it was the
United States that intended to and indeed did call the shots, while simul-
taneously being somewhat constrained by these organizations. While the
United States was eager to obtain U.N. approval for military intervention
and to develop cooperation with these international organizations and,
more particularly, certain nations, in the end it wanted to decide when
and how to intervene. The multilateral approach, however, to some
extent, limited the freedom of the United States to act unilaterally.
Horse-trading almost certainly took place.
107. E.g., Brian Concannon Jr., 'Naje Pou Soti': Legal Obstacles Facing Haiti's Prval,
JURIST, Mar. 8, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/03/naje-pou-soti-legal-obstacles-
facing.php; Kenneth Freed, Next Step; Haiti: A Society Burning with Sorrow, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1993, at 1 (estimating that more than ten thousand people have starved to death since the first
international embargo went into effect in October 1991); see also Howard W. French, Study Says
Haiti Sanctions Kill Up to 1,000 Children a Month; Harvard Report Finds a Big Rise in
Malnutrition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1993, at Al (estimating that, as a result of embargo, an
additional thousand Haitian children were dying each month).
108. Terry Atlas, U.S. Lifts Most Haiti Sanctions Curbs Remain on Military, Nation's Elite,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1994, at 1; Anne-Marie O'Connor, Haiti's Wealthy May Avoid Sting of
Sanctions, PrrTSBURGH POST-GAzErrE, June 11, 1994, at A4.
109. STOT-ZKY, supra note 91, at 175-76 (1997). For example, Joseph Michel Francois was the
Chief of Police of Port-au-Prince during the de facto government's reign of terror between 1991
and 1994. He was heavily involved in drug trafficking. Indeed, on March 7, 1997, he was indicted
in Miami on charges that he helped smuggle 66,000 pounds of cocaine and heroin into the United
States. Indictment, United States v. Ketant, No. 97-6007, at 11-14 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 21 1997). He
placed the military structure in Haiti under his control to help ship large amounts of drugs into the
United States. I discovered much of this information as the chairman of an international drug
commission in Haiti from 2000-2003.
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Third, the Security Council resolution contained some important
restrictions that affected the development of troops in Haiti. It author-
ized invasion only by a "multinational force," so that the United States
had to seek support from other states. Moreover, the resolution author-
ized using "all necessary means" only to "facilitate the departure from
Haiti of the military leadership consistent with the Governors Island
Agreement."" Furthermore, with respect to a new government, it
authorized only the restoration of the Aristide government."' This is
important because Aristide was viewed negatively by many politi-
cians-mostly very conservative and right-wing politicians-in the
United States. The resolution also established a U.N. observer force to
monitor the operations of the multinational force and to lay the ground-
work for a peacekeeping force." 2
Fourth, the Haiti case illustrates the inherent tension between seek-
ing all possible non-forcible means for ending a crisis and effectively
addressing that crisis. For example, the last-hour success of the Carter
delegation in averting a violent military invasion undoubtedly saved
lives. Unfortunately, it also resulted in recognition of the "honor" of and
a general amnesty for the de facto military leaders who had frequently
been branded by President Clinton as thugs and murderers. One can gen-
eralize from these facts as follows: the less force used in the interven-
tion, the greater is the sense that the international community is not
intruding too excessively into the sovereignty of a nation. At the same
time, however, the less forcible the intervention, the greater must be the
compromises made by the international community to accommodate the
de facto authorities who necessitated the intervention in the first place.
This, of course, may cause problems for the creation of a democracy for
years to come."
3
Fifth, Haiti is an example of a pattern of initial intervention led by a
major power to be followed by a U.N.-commanded force charged with
assisting in establishing, to some extent, some form of national reconcil-
iation. The U.N. demanded that the initial force disarm the de facto gov-
ernment forces because it feared that a U.N.-commanded force would be
unable to do so. The United States, however, refused to engage in a
broad disarmament campaign, which has resulted in serious security
problems for the democratically elected government and the people of
Haiti.
Sixth, the Haitian people strongly desired justice and reconciliation,
110. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 86, 4.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See STOTZKY, supra note 91, at 17-51.
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thereby establishing a strong basis for the international community to
provide useful assistance and resources to Haiti in helping to create the
conditions needed to establish a democracy. But, over the years, frustra-
tion has replaced hope. Increased violence has replaced frustration.' 14
Seventh, it is undeniable that Security Council resolution 940'1
will be seen in at least two ways. It will be seen as a precedent for a very
expansive view of what can constitute a threat to international peace
and, therefore, used in support of multinational action through the U.N.
to promote the development (or at least the preservation) of democra-
cies. On the other hand, as I stated above, Haiti may also be seen as a
singular, unusual case in which the vagaries of domestic United States
politics are not likely to be repeated.
Finally, the Haiti case illustrates the difficulty that the United States
government faces in using force unilaterally or even with multinational
support and, simultaneously, a method for overcoming any domestic
roadblocks to the use of force. The difficulty in using force reflects the
influence of the doctrine attributed to General Colin Powell when he
served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."1 6 According to this
doctrine, United States military force should be used abroad only rarely,
and then with overwhelming power, in order to avoid debilitating casu-
alties and engagements such as the Vietnam War." 7 This approach
caused the Pentagon to oppose most of the military engagements urged
on it by others in Washington.II 8 As long as Powell remained in power
(until September 1993), the use of force in Haiti was unlikely.' 9 In
addition, Powell's doctrine derived not only from his personal charisma
and military credentials, but also from Clinton's weak position vis-A-vis
the United States military. He was seen as someone who had chosen to
avoid serving in Vietnam and whose earliest policy priorities included
the acceptance of gays in the military, which had foundered ignomini-
ously on the Pentagon's opposition. 120
Precisely because Clinton's military options on Haiti were circum-
scribed by the Pentagon's reservations and by Congressional skepticism
over the use of force in Haiti, a U.N. framework for addressing the crisis
114. For a discussion of some of these problems and possible solutions to them, see discussion
infra Parts IV and V.
115. See S.C. Res. 940, supra note 86.
116. See COLIN L. POWELL WITH JOSEPH E. PERSICO, My AMERICAN JOURNEY 434 (1995).
117. Id.
118. For example, Powell quotes Madeline Albright as chafing at the constraints his policy
imposed on United States policy in Bosnia. See id. at 576.
119. He changed course on Iraq. This will forever remain a blot on his record.
120. Cf Steve Goldstein, Colin Powell: Will He Run? He's Not Talking About a White House
Bid. Both Supporters and Detractors Wonder, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 21, 1994, at AOl (discussing
Colin Powell's service in Vietnam and his opposition to allowing gays in the military).
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was invaluable to Clinton. Thus, as of 1993, the U.N. was at the heart of
Clinton's Haiti policy. Once the Clinton Administration decided that
only the use of force would dislodge the de facto regime in Haiti, it still
faced the very tricky problem of lending domestic and international
legitimacy to this goal. It used the U.N. Security Council to achieve it.
For example, with Security Council authorization in hand, the Clinton
Administration did not seek Congressional support for the multinational
force under the War Powers Resolution,' 2' as many of its critics in Con-
gress of both parties then demanded. 12 2 The timing of the multinational
forces landing in Haiti was apparently designed to occur before Con-
gressional opposition overwhelmed the Clinton Administration.123 Thus,
one important lesson from the Haiti case is that the multilateral route for
the promotion of what is perceived as United States national interests
and for the use of force can be rewarding. It certainly can help to over-
come domestic opposition and perhaps even convince domestic opinion
of the legitimacy of the use of force to "restore democracy." It can also
be used to defuse any regional opposition to such strategy. 124
IV. THE TRANSITION PROCESS
The Haiti case is suggestive for other significant reasons. It teaches
important lessons about the difficulties of the transition process and the
creation and stabilization of a democratic nation. It demonstrates that if
the relevant political actors, both domestic and international, are to be
successful in helping to create the conditions for democracy to bloom,
they must be highly educated and thoughtful on a number of significant
issues. They must be intimately familiar with, and understand the history
and culture of, a nation. They must understand the major problems and
121. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2008). The Act was passed in 1973 to constrict the
President's ability to introduce United States military forces into hostilities without congressional
approval.
122. E.g., Marilyn Greene, GOP Puts Clinton on Notice: Foreign Policy Our Game Now, USA
TODAY, Dec. 12, 1994, at 10A. See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH.(1
9 9 3 ).
123. The Clinton Administration never publicly argued that Security Council authorization
substituted for Congressional approval, but the Administration's timing and actions strongly
suggest this position. Importantly, the Clinton Administration did not take the legal position that
Congressional consent was superfluous because Security Council authorization sufficed. See
Kavanagh, supra note 84, at 180-82. Such a position would surely have caused a Congressional
uproar. Instead, the Administration claimed that the planned deployment was consistent with the
sense of Congress as expressed in the Defense Appropriations Act of 1994, that it satisfied the
requirements of the War Powers Resolution, and that the operation was "not a war in the
constitutional sense." See Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 96, 122 (1995) (discussing the War Powers Act and the
deployment of military forces into Haiti).
124. President George W. Bush has never learned this lesson.
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
complexities inherent in the transition from dictatorship to democracy.
And they must have a clear vision of the justificatory theories for
democracy. To put it another way, the creative experiments necessary to
transform a society will not take place without such knowledge, and the
international community's effort to help nations overcome their authori-
tarian legacies will simply fail. Unfortunately, the international commu-
nity's recent efforts in Haiti since 1994 illustrate this failure.
The original intervention by the international community in 1994
and its approach to Haiti have been successful in a very limited way, but
the long term prognosis for creating the conditions for democracy to
flower has been shattered by events since that intervention. The interna-
tional community was successful in restoring the Aristide government to
power, and political power was transferred from one duly elected gov-
ernment to another-from Aristide to Prdval, from Pr6val back to Aris-
tide, and from Aristide back to Pr6val. This adds up to a total of four
democratically elected governments since 1990. The Army was abol-
ished and a new and at first relatively well-trained police force was cre-
ated which, for all its limitations, functioned reasonably well for a short
period under extremely difficult conditions.' 25 Today it is in disorder.
Political violence, criminal violence, and human rights violations are
once again a serious problem. Abject poverty, disease, and unemploy-
ment, among other serious problems, persist. Life for the vast majority
of Haitians remains frightening.
In spite of their problems, Haitians do not expect or want a return to
dictatorship, however benign. When one looks to the future, it is clear
that democratization remains at an embryonic stage. The democratiza-
tion process has been reversed. In point of fact, since 2004, Haiti has
clearly been sliding in the wrong direction.
It is relatively clear that the international community, particularly
the United States, dramatically underestimated the Haitian challenge.
After the success of the 1994 military intervention, the international
community did not have a well thought-out plan linked to the publicly
stated reasons for the intervention-to restore democracy-that would
have given the Haitian people a fighting chance to challenge success-
fully some of those almost unresolveable problems. 126 The international
125. See Carol J. Williams, Haiti Debates Having a Homegrown Army; The Military Was
Disbanded in 1995, and Some Think it's Time To Put it Back Together, L.A. Ttss, July 30, 2007,
at A8. The United Nations trained the police force, and appointed former New York City Police
Commissioner Ray Kelly to head the training group. See Ron Howell, Offer To Train Rookies in
Native Land, NEWSDAY, Mar. 8, 2004, at A23.
126. This is the point at which theory becomes important. Contrary to most people who favor
democracy, I believe that justificatory theories of democracy are essential for creating solutions to
the problems. See STozKY, supra note 91.
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community simply assumed that economic and political development,
and social harmony, would be relatively easy to achieve. This was a
dangerous illusion. In fact, there appears to be an inverse relationship
between these factors. The very weaknesses of Haitian institutions and
modes of operation, which made the military engagement so easy and
successful, make the economic, political, and social challenges so diffi-
cult. The debility of Haitian institutions and their operations provided no
strong basis for resisting a military invasion; neither did they, or the
culture that had emaciated them, provide a foundation for democratic,
political, or economic development. The society lacks a cohesive
national identity and any sense of collective purpose.
Therefore, before political actors can judge whether humanitarian
intervention in the guise of military force and the occupation of a coun-
try is justified, they need to have a clear understanding of the goals of
intervention and whether they are justifiable. Simply because the action
may be "legal" does not, of course, necessarily make it morally justifia-
ble. These political actors also need to understand the problems associ-
ated with any transition to democracy and to be imaginative in trying to
resolve those problems, working within the history and culture of that
particular nation. Transformation requires knowledge, theory, and the
courage to take steps necessary for positive reform.
To begin with, one needs a moral justification for democracy."'
Most political actors involved in the process of consolidating democratic
regimes, however, find conceptions of democracy, and all they entail,
relevant only from the perspective of subjective legitimacy; that is, from
the perspective of the functionality of the political system. Subjective
legitimacy is the generalized belief of the population in the moral justifi-
ability of the government and its directives. Democracy is therefore seen
as an instrument to the end goal of stability. In effect, those engaged in
democratic transition who propose institutional reforms are attempting
to create, consolidate, and stabilize democratic structures while averting
threats of reversal to authoritarian alternatives. These political actors and
scholars are clearly firm partisans of democracy and take it for granted
that it is the best political system. They do not, however, consider that
what makes democracy the best political system is relevant to ascertain-
ing the means for its creation and preservation. Instead, they typically
adopt a perspective characterized by a results-oriented process, conclud-
ing that whatever is responsible for making democracy the morally best
system of government can be identified by certain factual features-
regular ways in which citizens may affect a change of government, the
127. For a thorough discussion and analysis of theories of democracy and suggested policies
derived from some of these theories, see STOTZKY, supra note 91.
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division of power, or respect for basic rights. Simply by identifying and
replicating the phenomenon or desired results, using a system in force in
some paradigmatic country, such as the United States, Britain or France,
these actors seek, in a value-neutral way, the proper means for achieving
or preserving that system.
This method is mistaken; indeed, it is deeply flawed. Democracy is
a normative concept and cannot be identified in depth without articulat-
ing fully the evaluative conception that justifies its distinctive institu-
tions. The inevitability of this normative inquiry is demonstrated by the
inherent conflicts and tensions within the distinctive institution of
democracy, making it impossible simply to identify and adopt appropri-
ate democratic institutions. Any number of questions can be raised to
prove this point. Is democracy the phenomenon of representation (the
weakest form of democracy), or is a system of representation merely an
auxiliary institution imposed by the difficulties of direct democracy in
an open society? Is it the separation of the executive and the legislative
powers, or is it instead an optimal arrangement that is not adopted in
parliamentary democracies without the loss of value? Is it the recogni-
tion of a bill of rights as limits to majoritarian decisions imposed by
independent judicial institutions? Are political parties distinctive demo-
cratic institutions, or are they unnecessary in a better working, well
functioning democracy? Is the proportional representative system the
best method of democratic representation, or is it only one of many
diverse alternatives that must be chosen for technical reasons?
When we come to realize the full range of these issues, it is clear
that there are no distinctive institutions of democracy outside of a value-
laden theory that simply justifies a set of options. We cannot identify
institutions commonly understood as democratic and work out a method
for stabilizing them without systematically analyzing the moral theory
that justifies them. Reality does not tell us which institutions are essen-
tial and which are contingent in relation to a normative concept like that
of democracy. We are unable to determine what contingencies we can
manipulate to preserve the essentials of the concept. The "realist" who
thinks otherwise is mistaken, even substantially confused.
While this is not the place to discuss fully theories of democracy
and their justifications, it is clear that the best means for countering
some of the difficulties of moving from dictatorship to democracy are to
create a polity governed by universal and impersonal principles where
individual citizens, who are not identified with any particular interests
but preserve the capacity of adopting different ones, make choices in a
process of public justification and dialogue. This requires broad popular
participation in governmental decision making and its consequent
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actions, led by strong participative and ideologically committed political
parties and parliamentary bodies. These parties and parliaments must
themselves, of course, be internally democratic, open, and disciplined.
These conclusions are based on an epistemic view of democracy
and upon the utmost respect for the autonomy of each individual. In this
view, autonomy consists of the exercise of self-governing capacities,
such as the capacities of understanding, imagining, reasoning, valuing,
and desiring. Free persons have, and are recognized as having, such
capacities. In a political order dedicated to serving the conditions of free
deliberation for its members, those members can legitimately expect of
that order that it not only permit, but also encourage the exercise of such
capacities-that it permit and encourage autonomy. Indeed, one of the
hallmarks of liberal democracy is the notion of the citizen who is not
identified with any interest, but is free to choose and has an equal voice
in expressing his choice.
Thus, it is apparent that the international community lacked a valid
normative conception of democracy when it intervened in Haiti and
failed to create the proper incentives in Haiti to help democracy grow.
Moreover, if the international community, lead by the United States, did
have a coherent normative conception of democracy, it seems to have
misunderstood how to apply it-to create the conditions for a constitu-
tional democracy to grow-to its actions in Haiti.
An additional serious problem afflicts the international effort in
Haiti and exacerbates the failure to understand the significance of nor-
mative justifications for democracy. There seems to be a misunderstand-
ing, even an ignorance, of the problems associated with the transition
and consolidation process.128 But before one can judge the potential for
a successful transition from dictatorship to democracy in any nation
undergoing this difficult process, one must understand the problems
associated with it. To put it another way, this process presents difficult
problems of its own that must be understood before one can create poli-
cies favorable to the creation of a democracy.
But there is a further complication. The problems of the transition
process and possible solutions to them, in turn, cannot be successfully
addressed without a valid justificatory theory of democracy. Theory and
practice go hand in hand. As a base line, such a democratic vision
requires a continuous order of mutually assured and encouraged auton-
omy in which political decisions are manifestly based on the judgments
of members of that society who are perceived and treated as free and
128. For an analysis of different characterizations of the process of transition see THE
BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES (Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., 1978); TRANSITONS
FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN AMERICA (Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1993) (1986).
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equal persons. The expression of self-governing capacities must operate
both within the formal institutions of politics and in the affairs of daily
life. The democratic order must satisfy the conditions of equal freedom
and autonomy that give it definition.
What are some of the issues associated with the creation and con-
solidation of a democracy? There are several significant features of the
consolidation of democracies that have taken place in Latin America and
Haiti. The first significant feature of the consolidation is the fact that the
process of democratization has taken place in many of these nations dur-
ing some of the worst economic, social, and political crises in the history
of these nations. In general, these crises include the commission of mas-
sive human rights violations (murder, rape, and torture), enormous
debts, hyperinflation, epidemics, dramatic and surprising increases in
already high rates of infant mortality, extremely high rates of unemploy-
ment, and the collapse of entire systems of social welfare.129
Haiti presents an uncomfortably extreme example of many of these
problems. There, the human and material resources are in such short
supply, or have been degraded by such severe poverty (even destitution),
illiteracy, malnutrition, disease, violence, corruption, overpopulation,
rapid urbanization, deforestation, and soil erosion, as to raise serious
questions about Haiti's continued survival as a society and as an inde-
pendent nation-state.
Even before the crisis erupted, between 1991 and 1994, over the
military's refusal to restore President Aristide to power, Haiti was the
poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. 3 ° Its per-capita income was
$370 a year.' 3 ' At that time, in a country of approximately seven million
people, there were fewer than a thousand doctors.'32 The life expectancy
was a mere fifty-six years, one in every eight babies died before reach-
ing the age of one, and seventy percent of all children were estimated to
suffer from some form of malnutrition. 3 3 At least two-thirds of the pop-
ulation were illiterate, and the state school system was so inefficient and
small that fewer than five percent of eligible students were enrolled in
government high schools. 1 34 As if these problems are not bad enough in
129. Argentina during the reign of terror is the prime example of these problems. See Jefferson
Morley, Argentina's Trial, Latin Tribulations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1985, at A27. See NAT'L
COMM'N ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS, NEVER AGAIN (Writers and Scholars Int'l trans.,
1986) (1984), http://web.archive.org/web/20031004074316/nuncamas.org/english/library/
nevagain/nevagain_- 001 .htm.
130. Haitians Resigned to Sanctions, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 24, 1993, at 10A.
131. John Kifner, Mission to Haiti: The Overview; Haitians Rejoice as American M.P. 's Visit
Police Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al.
132. Larry Rohter, Haiti Is a Land Without a Country, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, at E3.
133. Id.
134. Id. The state of education, a key to development, is one of the major reasons that Haiti
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themselves, many of the doctors, engineers, administrators, and others
with the necessary skills to change Haiti have been killed or driven into
exile. 135 Most of those who are in exile do not wish to risk their lives
and fortunes by returning to Haiti until positive changes occur.1 3 6 The
irony is that Haiti needs these very same people to make the changes
that would attract them to return. Unfortunately, these conditions have
not improved since the "restoration of democracy." It is clear that many
of these conditions have become even more serious since the interna-
tional military intervention.1
31
The most difficult obstacles to democracy in many countries, par-
ticularly in Haiti, however, may be psychological and cultural. For
example, the tradition of a predatory, oppressive state has left Haitians
deeply distrustful of government and of foreigners. Haiti's political cul-
ture has long been characterized as an admiration of force. Political dis-
putes are often settled not by negotiation, but through the exercise of
force, and respect for democratic procedures and obligations, including
reasoned justifications for actions, is minimal.
remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The teachers remain wholly inadequate to the
task of educating the millions of those desiring to improve their lives. For example, in December
1996 and January 1997, Haiti's approximately twelve hundred grade school teachers took a simple
test, and almost all of them failed it. Only .four hundred could alphabetize a list of words; only
forty-one could arrange fractions by size. This ignorance is reflected in the students. More than
half of the children between six and twelve cannot read. In addition, classrooms are extremely
overcrowded-some have more than two hundred students-and most classrooms do not have
benches, chalkboards, or even doors. See Michael Norton, Teacher Strike Highlights Education
Crisis in Haiti; They Want Better Training-and Their Pay, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 13, 1997, at 8A.
135. Indeed, there are sizable populations of exiled Haitians in New York, Montreal, Paris, and
Miami.
136. See Interview with Jean Jean-Pierre, Journalist, The Vill. Voice, in New York, N.Y. (Aug.
5, 2005).
137. For example, in 2004, according to estimates by the World Bank, Haiti's gross national
income (GNI) measured at 2002-2004 prices was equivalent to $390 per head or $1,680 per head
on an international purchasing-power parity basis. I THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 2058 (47th
ed. 2006). "In 1995-2004 the population increased at an average annual rate of 2.0%, while gross
domestic product (GDP) per head decreased, in real terms, by an average of 1.2% per year." Id.
During this time period (1995-2004), "Haiti's overall GDP decreased, in real terms, at an average
annual rate of 0.8%." Id. In 2003-2004, real GDP decreased by 3.8%. Id. In 1997, primary school
enrollment "included only 19.4% of children in the relevant age-group (18.9% of boys; 19.9% of
girls)." Id. at 2059. In 1997, secondary school enrollment included only 34.2% of children in the
relevant age-group (35.2% of boys; 33.2% of girls). Id. "In 1999 combined enrolment in primary,
secondary and tertiary education was 52%." Id. In addition, children in Haiti are more likely to die
during early childhood than in any other country in the Western Hemisphere. The under-five
mortality rate in 2004 was 117 per 1000 live births. Id. at 2060. In fact, one of every fourteen
babies in Haiti dies before reaching his or her first birthday. U.N. CHILDREN'S FUND [UNICEF],
CHILD ALERT: HAITI 1 (2006), available at http://www.unicef.org/childalert/haiti/. Moreover, in
2007, the life expectancy at birth was 57.03 years. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD
FACT BOOK 2007, at 250 (2007). Malnutrition is, of course, another serious problem. Indeed, one
of every three children in Haiti is chronically malnourished. Specialist Tries To Reverse
Malnutrition in Haiti, BIOTECH L. W.Y., Sept. 1, 2006, at 457.
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Furthermore, there is great controversy in the international commu-
nity about whether the problems associated with these transitions and the
attempts to address them are leading to a change in the economic and
social structures of these countries necessary to allow for a new oligo-
polization of the economy. To put it another way, it remains unclear
whether a new oligopolization will develop which will greatly restrict
the avenues of access for the powerless sectors of society to the basic
goods necessary for leading a life of dignity, or whether, on the contrary,
the crisis is leading to more efficient schemes of production, thereby
benefiting all sectors of society. In Haiti, the unequal distribution of
resources, and thus the general living conditions, has become even more
disparate since the international military intervention. The elites have
obtained an even larger share of the wealth than they possessed before
the intervention, and everyone else (more than ninety percent of the pop-
ulation) has been made worse off.'3 8 This has lead to a loss of hope,
indeed, even to a sense of desperation on the part of the vast majority of
Haitians.
The problem is even more difficult than it is generally perceived to
be. In many of the nations in the transition process, but particularly in
Haiti, the present circumstances result from a long-fought war of attri-
tion against the vast majority by a small but ruthless ruling class. Ironi-
cally, Haiti is the product of a revolution against slavery and
colonialism. It emerged as a nation in 1804, after a thirteen-year struggle
against France that resulted in the destruction of the French colony of
Saint Dominique. 39 Almost immediately after independence, the Hai-
tian elites attempted to recreate the plantation economy, treating the
rural masses in much the same way as the French colonial oppressors
had treated them. The former slaves, however, simply refused to return
to a state of slavery. Instead, they settled as small peasants on land
bought or re-conquered from the State, or abandoned by large landown-
ers. The urban elites then devised a dual strategy to counter this
problem.
The first part of the plan was economic. The elites used the fiscal
and marketing systems of the country to create wealth-producing mecha-
nisms for themselves. They became traders, politicians, and state
employees. They prospered by living off the peasants' labor. Taxes col-
lected by the import-export bourgeoisie at the urban markets and cus-
138. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACInCES-2003 (2004), available at http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27902.htm.
139. For a general discussion of the history of Haiti see DAVID NICHOL.S, FROM DESSALINES
TO DUVALIER: RACE, COLOUR AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE IN HAITI (1979); see also STOTZKY,
supra note 91; TROUILLOT, supra note 17.
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tomhouses-paid solely by the peasants-provided the entire source of
government revenues. The elites then took over the state and used the
state revenues as their personal bank accounts. 4°
The second part of the plan was political. The strategy was to iso-
late the peasants on small mountain plots and keep them away from
politics. It was a brilliant but corrupt strategy. The peasants, who
unknowingly subsidized the elites, had no say whatsoever in how the
state was to be run. The exploitation continued throughout the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. For example, beginning in the late 1950s,
Papa "Doc" Duvalier came to power and exploited this plan. He used the
state funds as his own personal bank account to enjoy incredible eco-
nomic and political power.' 4 ' Even today, the entrepreneurial class con-
tinues to prosper at the expense of the vast majority of Haitians. Indeed,
many Haitians continue to feel enslaved.
Under the best of circumstances, a nation such as Haiti cannot be
changed structurally without some yielding of power by the haves-the
economic elite. But, of course, rulers who profit from stasis are disin-
clined to risk change. Moreover, if it is to be the policy of the United
States and the rest of the international community, which it appears to
be, to sustain at all costs the present distribution of economic power in
Haiti, hardly anything can be done that will necessarily have long-range
beneficial political and social consequences and thus allow Haiti to
become a constitutional democratic nation.
A second prominent obstacle that nations face in the transition pro-
cess is the corrosive power of the phenomenon known as corporatism.' 42
Indeed, for the transition process to succeed, the people must dissolve
the network of de facto power relationships, which corporations create
and jealously protect by taking advantage of the power vacuum left by
representatives of popular sovereignty. Under the umbrella of authorita-
rian rule, a number of social groups representing particular interests
sculpt a place for themselves after a bargaining process which includes
their support for the present regime. Such groups include the military,
religious organizations, coalitions of entrepreneurs, trade unions, and
even the so-called independent press. Once democratic rule is estab-
140. See BERNARD DIEDERICH & AL BURT, PAPA Doc: HAITI AND ITS DICTATOR (1986); JAMES
FERGUSON, PAPA Doc, BABY Doc: HAITI AND THE DUVALIERS 30-59 (1987); TROUILLOT, supra
note 17.
141. For analysis of all of these points, see STOTZKY, supra note 91, see TROUILLOT, supra
note 17.
142. For an interesting discussion of the concept of corporatism and its relationship to state and
society in Latin America see AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA (James
M. Malloy ed., 1977). For a discussion of corporatism see Irwin P. Stotzky, Suppressing the
Beast, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 883, 884-90 (1999).
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lished, these groups stubbornly resist relinquishing their power to repre-
sentatives of the people.
Corporatism is usually expressed and functions in complicated
ways. There is some control by the State over these interest groups and
organizations, many of which are part of civil society, and there are a
variety of official and unofficial mechanisms that are used to alter their
operation. 43 Simultaneously, however, these organizations exert enor-
mous pressures upon government actors and agencies. These pressures
allow the corporative forces to obtain favored treatment of various
kinds, amounting to a legal monopoly of particular interests. Sometimes
this monopoly power of the corporative interests is unaccompanied by
any significant state influence over these forces. In other situations,
alternative legal or even constitutional privileges short of monopoly may
be granted that shield the organization from the raw competitive forces
of popular expression, such as a free market.
Corporatism is an insidious and powerful force, and it is very diffi-
cult to overcome. Haiti is a harsh example of the devastation created by
corporatism. Between 1991 and 1994 the military corporative forces
assumed total power and influence in, and completely violated and
destroyed any semblance of democratic practices and institutions. 14 The
military forces consolidated their rule by intentionally and ruthlessly
suppressing Haiti's once diverse and vibrant civil society. They assassi-
nated approximately 5000 people, brutalized and tortured thousands of
others, and forced perhaps 500,000 people to go underground. 14 5 The
military systematically repressed virtually all forms of independent asso-
ciation in an attempt to deny the Haitian people any organized base for
opposition.
Aristide's major accomplishment as President was to abolish the
military.146 Recently, the democratically elected government has
attempted to prosecute military officials who were involved in massive
human rights violations.1 47 But security is an absolute necessity to pur-
143. For example, some governments allow private firms to control or monopolize certain
industries such as the power and telecommunications industries.
144. During this period, several thousand Haitians were murdered, illegally arrested, detained,
tortured or forced into hiding. Unfortunately Aristide's reinstatement to office did not totally stop
the violence. Indeed, political murder continued after his return and into President Prdval's term.
STO1-ZKY, supra note 91, at 28-29 nn.51 & 54.
145. See Interview with Cathy Maternowska, supra note 19; Interview Jean Jean-Pierre, supra
note 136.
146. Rohter, supra note 91.
147. For example, in August 1995, a mid-level member of the para-military group FRAPH was
convicted of the murder of Antoine Izmery, a prominent businessman and supporter of Aristide.
There have been on-going investigations of human rights offenses committed by the de facto
regime between 1991 and 1994 since the return of Aristide in 1994. On September 20, 2000, after
an investigation that started shortly after President Aristide's reinstatement in 1994, the Haitian
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sue this strategy. With approximately 250,000 automatic weapons
cached around the country, 148 stability remains fragile. The failure to
understand corporative power and the fear of placing international forces
in harm's way led to a failure by the multinational forces to disarm the
military, in spite of the fact that such a campaign was clearly compatible
with Security Council Resolution 940.149 Part of this misunderstanding
was the belief that removal of all privately held weapons in Haiti would
have seriously disturbed the balance of power in Haitian society, danger-
ously concentrating all fire power in the hands of a democratically
elected government whose long-term commitment to the rule of law and
democracy could not be guaranteed. This grave error has led to unneces-
sary suffering. Indeed, the international community's failure to disarm
the former military forces has led to a surge in garden variety crimes,
attacks on Parliament and on the Haitian National Police, an increas-
ingly large number of drug related murders committed by former mili-
tary officials who have formed criminal gangs, 5' and the second violent
overthrow of the democratically elected Aristide government.
The entrepreneurial sector constitutes another corporative source
directed at the democratically elected government. It seeks to obtain a
government began the prosecution of dozens of former military leaders for the massacre of at least
fifteen residents of a poor neighborhood in Gonafves in April 1994. Marie-Andre Auguste, Coup
Leader, Army Officers Given Life in Prison for 1994 Haitian Massacre, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov.
16, 2000. The Raboteau slayings were part of a series of attacks undertaken by the coup leaders to
break support for Aristide. Id. At the trial, only twenty-two of the defendants actually appeared in
court. Id. On November 9, 2000, sixteen of these twenty-two defendants were convicted of taking
part in the massacre. Id. Twelve of the sixteen, including the military commander of the town at
the time of the massacre, Captain Castera C6nafils, and a grassroots figure turned paramilitary
leader, Jean Tatoune, were sentenced to life in prison with hard labor. The other four defendants
received sentences of up to nine years imprisonment. Six defendants were acquitted. Id. All of the
convicted defendants also were ordered to pay the equivalent of $2,300-a large amount in
Haiti-to a fund to benefit the families of the victims.
On November 16, 2000, a Haitian court sentenced the fifteen defendants who did not appear
in court, and were being tried in absentia, to life in prison with hard labor. The absent defendants
include coup leaders Raoul Cedras and Philippe Biamby, both of whom received asylum in
Panama; former Port-au-Prince police chief, Michel Francois, who is in Honduras; and
paramilitary leader Emmanuel Constant, who cut a deal with the C.I.A. and lives in New York
City. Id. Prosecutors alleged that they masterminded the attack. Id. Lawyers were not allowed to
defend the absent defendants. Id. Judge Napla Saintil tried them without a jury exclusively on the
basis of a 172-page bill of accusation presented to the court by the Haitian government
prosecutors. Id. The absent defendants will be arrested if they return to Haiti, but would have the
right to a new trial if they return. Id. Moreover, the Haitian government has asked a number of
nations, including the United States, to extradite several former military officials who have been
indicted in Haiti for committing murders during the coup period. The United States has refused to
do so.
148. See Interview with Cathy Maternowska, supra note 19; Interview with Jean Jean-Pierre,
supra note 136.
149. See S.C. Res. 940, supra note 86.
150. See, e.g., STOTZKY, supra note 91, at 29 n.54.
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variety of privileges or protective measures and preserve those previ-
ously secured. In Haiti, the entrepreneurial sector has attempted to boy-
cott many measures designed to achieve progressive levels of
taxation. 151 It has also pushed hard for the complete privatization of nine
state owned industries, hoping to secure them and reap huge profits. 152
This elite class has ruled Haiti since its independence in 1804, using the
state resources as its personal bank account and keeping the vast major-
ity of Haitians in a state of extreme poverty, even slavery.
The corporative actors do not, however, play the same role in each
nation. For example, the Catholic Church does not function in Haiti as it
does in Argentina and trade unions hold different positions in Haiti than
in Brazil. But the script is nevertheless repeated in each country because
the formal creation or establishment of democratic rule is simply not
sufficient to destroy the corporative power relationships built up during
the dictatorship periods. The corporations try to preserve their power
relations and privileges through the transition, generating different types
of crises, such as a military or economic threat, which exert tremendous
pressure on the fragile economic regime.
Inextricably intertwined and connected in a multitude of ways to
these two features of the transition and consolidation process (the eco-
nomic, political, and social crises and the problems of corporatism) is a
third factor-the failure to fulfill the requirements of the rule of law in
both the formal and informal aspects of public and private life. In Haiti,
as in virtually every other nation undergoing the transition from dictator-
ship to democracy, this failure manifests itself in the concentration of
power solely in the executive branch of government, leading to massive
human rights abuses and a total disregard for the functions of the other
branches of government. For example, during the coup period
(1991-1994), members of the Haitian armed forces systematically assas-
sinated and tortured thousands of people, including government officials
who attempted to uphold the rule of law. 53 Indeed, the military blatantly
ignored judicial orders to arrest soldiers or officers accused of human
rights abuses.' 54 It ignored the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion and any laws passed by Parliament which threatened its hold on
power.'55 In light of this and Haiti's history of these abuses, a Creole
151. Id. at 90 n.18.
152. Interview with Jean Jean-Pierre, supra note 136. Elites constantly refer to their desire to
maintain their monopolies on state-owned industries, particularly the power and communications
industries.
153. STOTZKY, supra note 91, at 29 n.54.
154. Id.
155. See id. During the most recent interim government period, 2004-2006, similar human
rights abuses occurred.
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proverb aptly summarizes the Haitian people's view about law: "Law is
paper; bayonet is steel."
The violation of legal norms, however, is not restricted to formal
military or de facto government officials. Unfortunately, such behavior
is a distinguishing mark of political and social life at large, and has
existed throughout the nation's history. This failure to follow the rule of
law is evident in both social practices and in the actions of governmental
officials.
This tendency toward unlawfulness does not, however, infect only
public officials. Unfortunately, it equally infects the general society.
This mentality correlates with a general trend toward anomie in society
as a whole. It manifests itself in such things as enormous black markets,
tax evasions, corruption in private economic activities, nonobservance of
efficient economic norms, and noncompliance with the most basic rules
of society, such as elementary traffic and urban regulations.' 56
This unlawfulness mentality is often the product and cause of col-
lective action problems. Frequently, the combination of expectations,
interests, possibilities of actions, and their respective payoffs is such that
the rational course of action for each participant in the process of politi-
cal or social interaction advises that person not to comply with a certain
norm, despite the fact that general compliance with it would have been
for the benefit of everybody in-Pareto's terms-or almost everybody.
This "dumb anomie" is intimately connected with both the stunting and
the reversal of economic and social development.
Therefore, for a successful transition to democracy to occur in
Haiti, it is critical for the international community to help Haitians con-
solidate the rule of law. This is important not only to secure respect for
fundamental rights and for the observance of the democratic process, but
also to achieve satisfactory levels of economic and social development.
But the international community seems to have misunderstood the con-
tours of the rule of law, placing its resources almost solely into strength-
ening the judiciary. Even those efforts have not appreciably improved
the system of justice. In point of fact, despite the international commu-
nity's best efforts to help strengthen the integrity of the judicial system,
it remains corrupt and inefficient. Indeed, years of corruption and gov-
ernmental neglect have left the judicial system nearly moribund. For
example, a shortage of adequately trained judges and prosecutors,
among other systemic problems, has created a huge backlog of criminal
cases, with many detainees waiting months or even years in pretrial
156. Argentina is an example of all these problems. See, e.g., Poll Finds Corruption Alive,
Well in Argentina; Bribery and Tax Evasion Remain Rampant, Survey of Top Executives Shows,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 4, 1998, at A7.
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detention before getting a court hearing. 5 7 If an accused person ulti-
mately is tried and found not guilty, there is no redress against the gov-
ernment for time served. 158 While it is certainly necessary to strengthen
the judiciary, this is simply insufficient to achieve the goal of establish-
ing the rule of law in Haiti.
V. A DIFFERENT VISION
While many of these problems and the legacy of their history can
only be overcome by the Haitian people, the international community's
help is essential. But only the correct international incentives directed at
the real problems will lead to a viable, sound democratic revolution in
Haiti. So far, these incentives have not been properly employed. The
deepest roots of Haiti's problems lie not simply or most significantly in
the country's politics or in its cultural history. Institutional reforms of
the type championed by the international community-such as total
privatization of state owned industries or "judicial reform"-will simply
not work until the more serious problems are confronted. While the
moral turpitude of the elites is real, Haiti's political problems lie in the
social and economic organization of the country. To put it another way,
Haiti's crisis lies in social inequality and economic maldistribution.
Unless and until these difficult issues are addressed, there is little hope
for positive changes for the millions of Haitians trapped in despair and
destitution. If they are addressed, however, it is likely that positive
changes in the political sphere will follow. The only hope Haiti has for
achieving a valid democracy is the creation of a new socioeconomic
arrangement, which will be difficult to initiate, and even harder to main-
tain. But the absence of material deprivation is a prerequisite for the
conditions necessary to create a constitutional democracy. What steps
must be taken to achieve this goal?
An energized, vital constitutional democracy means much more
than holding periodic elections. It requires an environment of personal
security for people to pursue their desires, their professions, to move
about freely, and to explore new ideas. Democracy also means, among
other things, the building of vibrant institutions of justice and law and
the full blooming of civil society-the broad array of political parties,
independent media, independent labor unions, and nongovernmental
organizations, such as women's groups, all of which encourage political
157. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note
138.
158. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTIcES-2001 (2002), available at http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8332.htm.
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and social participation. While these choices-and democracy is always
a choice-cannot necessarily be imposed by the international commu-
nity, they certainly can be encouraged by it.
While many nations are reaching for democracy, what are the pol-
icy choices for changing the political economy? The overriding charac-
teristic of the political life and discourse of nations in the transition
process is a frustrated desire to escape the choice between a nationalist-
populist project and a neoliberal project. The rejection of these alterna-
tives and dictatorship has a deeper meaning than is traditionally under-
stood. It is a revulsion against a feigned public life, which is in fact little
more than a weapon or disguise of private interests. The problem is not
unique to Haiti. It is reflected in the institutional structures of many
developing nations. 5 9 The dominant regimes of the less-developed
economies, and even their critics, often start with the desire merely to
imitate and import the institutional arrangements of the rich industrial
democracies. They do this in the hope that from similar institutional
devices, similar economic and political development will result. But
such imitation has not led to these desired results. The failure of these
efforts at emulation may nevertheless be useful to the development of
new and experimental institutional structures, which may shed light on
the suppressed opportunities for transformation. But Haiti and many of
these nations have not yet started on this path.
The import-substituting protectionist style of industrialization and
the pseudo-Keynesian public finance of a national-populist approach is
unable to deal effectively with the huge problems facing these nations.
Latin America, for example, still faces the problems of hyperinflation
and stagnation created by irrationally closed economies and massive
public spending.16° Neoliberalism (neoliberalismo), the single-minded
pursuit of foreign investment and its accompanying austerity and ine-
quality, is unable to service the real conditions of sustained economic
growth.
Neoliberalism's rise to the status of religious doctrine is largely due
to the influence of the United States, particularly in regulating and con-
trolling the conduct of international monetary and trade organizations.
The Reagan Administration pushed the Latin Americans into pro-busi-
ness austerity programs and set the tone for a worldwide reduction of
government rule. Neoliberalism's acceptance is also due to the policies
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and to the
159. This notion is reflected in any Latin American nation in which a very small group of very
rich people control the government. See, e.g., Latin America in Deep Recession-South America
Suffering from Succession of Economic Shocks, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 22, 1990, at B6.
160. Again, Argentina and Brazil are prime examples.
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wealth of its corporative backers in a region where money matters above
all else in politics. Nevertheless, globalization has not had the desired
consequences.
What is clearly needed now is to somehow fix neoliberalism's
major flaw-chiefly that it does not help the poor, vast majority live a
dignified life. Instead, corporative power creates wealth for a small
minority, while almost enslaving the majority. If democracy seeking
governments do not spread the benefits of globalization, countries such
as Haiti will remain divided between a very small group of ultrarich
economic elite and a very large group of desperately poor and marginal-
ized people.
Unlike neoliberalism's claim that government should play a minor
role in the economy, real democratic change requires government to
play an important and dynamic role. At a minimum, the international
community must encourage these governments to pursue locally
designed policies to draw the poor into the global economy. To achieve
this minimal goal, these governments must be given incentives to pursue
a vision of a political economy that is quite different than the image
traditionally suggested.
In political economy terms, promising alternatives which will allow
a flowering of democracy might develop in a seriously underdeveloped
nation such as Haiti in a variety of rather experimental directions. Each
of these experiments, of course, must be continuously monitored so they
can be changed as they unfold to meet the requisite goals of democrati-
zation. This method is one of the few ways that a positive transformation
may take place in Haiti. Flexibility is a key to success.
Moreover, what we may be able to say and do about the future
possibilities of democratization depends crucially on our interpretation
of contemporary political, social and economic history. The radical
change many of these nations are making from inward oriented statist
growth is still in full swing. Macroeconomic policy makers still wrestle
with price instability and proper exchange rate regimes. External threats
and internal mistakes only prolong the transition and generate uncertain-
ties that exacerbate the problems. Simultaneously, microeconomic
changes, technical leaps and innovations, the legal evolution of firms,
and the use and disbursement of property rights are still more in flux
than fixed on the eve of new cycles of growth or retraction.
At first blush, it may appear that Haiti's relationship to the world
economy leaves it with relatively few options. But I believe that options
do exist. Although we understand large-scale transitions imperfectly,
what we do know is that decisions made while institutions and partner-
ships are being created and forged have significant-indeed enormous-
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subsequent effects. Thus the conjuncture of deep structural transforma-
tion means that what these nations do now will shape what they can do
later. It is not just the structures, but also the rules that will shape them,
that are changing.
Three major areas of concern are evident in the social, political and
economic spheres. The first involves money. Macroeconomic instability
is a major force in undermining the ability of people, rich and poor alike,
to save and invest for the long term view. International sources may
help, but without local savings or investment, they often leave these
nations exposed to forces over which they have the least control.
The second area of concern is the legal structure girding ownership
and use of property rights. Reform of corporate law and the emergence
of a new regulatory regime (paradigm) may help private parties to seize
upon new property rights to create new enterprises and new industries.
In both of these areas, the liberalization of the market is the factor that
should give the single biggest boost to long-term growth. Increasing
growth, however, is not the same as sustaining it. In both of these areas,
rule making and enforcement will certainly become the cornerstones for
growth.
The third concern is the approach to human capital. Both the long-
term view and long-term progress will be shaped by human skills and
aptitudes. In Latin American and Haiti, for example, the educational sys-
tems are impoverished. Good, sound education is scarce and increas-
ingly hard to find. It is, therefore, expensive and unequally distributed. If
it is true, as many claim, that education yields increasing returns, this is
clearly a matter of urgency for these nations.
These three areas of concern do not necessarily add up to an indict-
ment of the state in Haiti. Rather, they are best seen as an injunction that
the state perform its role as a state, with public duties and public author-
ity. Indeed, there are public goods-sound currency, security, the rule of
law, and education-for which the state has an overwhelming, indeed
incomparable comparative advantage. Long-term growth in this region
may well depend on governments' abilities to appreciate and exploit
their own mandates and resources. An active state is essential to the
success of such democratic reforms.
If governments are to play this major role, what steps can they
take? First, as I have already suggested, it is important that Haiti and
these other nations take macroeconomic stabilization very seriously.
One way of doing this is through a dramatic rise in and focusing of the
tax rate which would impose upon the privileged classes and regions of
these nations the costs of public investment in people and in infrastruc-
ture. It would be utterly unrealistic for these nations to take another
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approach and conceive of a sound financial system as one based on a
drastic lowering of governmental expenditure rather than on a raising
and rationalization of taxes. There needs to be a strong preference for a
universal, direct consumption-based tax-taxing, in a steeply progres-
sive way, the difference between income and savings-as the means to
finance the state while promoting capital formation and productive
investment. Countries like Argentina and Haiti will need large amounts
of international aid for a long period to augment these taxings, because
these nations are in financial crisis. But this aid must not be based on the
same schemes that have harmed their economies and helped lead these
nations into their present predicaments.
Second, there must be a push to train the poor majority in a variety
of skills needed in the global economy. Simultaneously, the state must
help create the conditions for an "anti-dualist" political economy. These
democratically minded governments have to aggressively attack and
overcome the internal division of these nations into two (or more) econ-
omies that are only tentatively and hierarchically connected. What is
needed is the consolidation and development of a technologically skilled
group of people-a vanguard-in both the public and private sectors,
and the use of this group to lift up and transform the immense, backward
second economy. This approach would also suggest attempting joint
public-private ownership of enterprises and encouraging decentralized
capital allocation and management. These two or more economies can-
not be allowed to become the platform for an antiquated fordist-style
industry that is unable to compete abroad except through internal wage
repression and that is incapable of transforming the second economy.
For example, networks of small and medium-sized enterprises represent
the most dynamic forces in many of the economies of the developing
nations and are even paralleled by external experiments in the large
businesses with the greatest potential for growth and innovation. These
intimations of an alternative, less conforming industrial future-chang-
ing the organization of firms, perhaps by making them more democratic,
as well as the character of regional economies within the country-need
to be developed by a deliberate economic program, sometimes with the
determined help of the international community. Indeed, the interna-
tional community must play a central role in this experiment through
monetary and technical assistance, including training people in highly
technical skills.
Third, if the breakdown of corporative control of the economy is to
succeed, the strict requirements of capitalism must be imposed on the
so-called free market capitalists through the privatization of the private
sector. Because market forces tend to concentrate wealth and power, a
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democratically minded government must ensure that no barriers exist to
participation in the market. Indeed, the more players in the market, the
less concentration of wealth and power. Otherwise, there is the omni-
present risk of the dominant player whose power may skew the debate or
the policy toward his own self-serving ends, which may not be demo-
cratically optimal ones. Therefore, the government must control monop-
oly, encourage business formation, and even compete to counteract the
power of the dominant big-business actors. In addition, the activist state
must protect local businesses from the overwhelming power of interna-
tional influences. Local voices remain unheard when powerful external
forces control the media, the economy or the political sphere.
There are, of course, many positive aspects to a private market. If
the economy is successfully privatized, this will mean real competition,
real refusal of the capitalization of profits through the socialization of
losses, real antitrust, real markets in corporate control, real constraints
on nepotism and inheritance, and real private responsibility for the costs
of public investment necessary to meet some of these goals. Such a capi-
talist regime requires parliament to pass laws, and the executive and the
courts to enforce them, opening the market so everyone can compete on
a somewhat level playing field.
These governments must also develop a parallel set of institutions
to compete in the marketplace. Public companies should be created and
developed to compete with the private ones. Moreover, these govern-
ments must impose on these public companies the requirements of seri-
ous and decisive competition and independent financial responsibility.
Total privatization of publicly owned companies is not necessarily a
good idea.
The last part of the plan is educational. There must be a massive
investment in people and infrastructure, financed by taxes on the people
with the goods-those who possess the wealth. There must be a priority
of such claims on the budget, backed by procedural devices with execu-
tory force. In addition, preventive public health, sanitation, and food
supplementation need to be given preference over therapeutic medicine.
Even more important for democratic change is the fact that the people
must be educated. Free public schools must be open to everyone, and
literacy programs created and developed. There must also be a shift of
the control of education away from the memorization of facts and
towards an emphasis upon the mastery of generic practical and concep-
tual capabilities.
In the organization of government, politics and civil society, the
alternative to nationalist-populist or neoliberalist projects may take the
form of a public-law counterpart to the political economy I have just
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outlined, animated by the same concerns and moving toward the same
goals. Experiments should be attempted in these areas as well. For
example, structural reforms require at least two sets of institutional inno-
vations. First, a merger of the electoral characteristics of presidential
regimes is needed, posing a periodic threat to oligarchic control of politi-
cal power. There must be a facility for rapid resolution of impasse
through priority accorded to programmatic legislation, liberal resort to
plebiscites and referenda, and perhaps the vesting of power in both the
legislative and executive branches of government to provoke anticipated
elections in the face of impasses over the direction any particular coun-
try should take. Second, measures must be taken to heighten the level
and to broaden the scope of political mobilization in society, especially
through the strengthening of the political parties, public financing of
political campaigns, increased free access to television and radio, and
the breakup of any broadcasting cartel. Direct democracy must be
encouraged at all levels of society.
The macropolitics of institutional change must be complemented
by a micropolitics confronting the logic of habitual social interactions.
The typical elements of this logic include a predominance of patron-
client relations, with their pervasive mingling in the same associations
and encounters of exchange, power, and sentimental allegiance. There is
frequently an oscillation between rule formalism and personal favorit-
ism, and each creates the opportunity and need for the other. There is
also a stark contrast between the treatment of "insiders" and "outsiders,"
and the consequent shortage of impersonal respect and reliability.
A democratic system must be capable of challenging and changing
both the established arrangements of the economy and the polity, and the
intimate habits of sociability. In this task, those who yearn for democ-
racy must combine a strategic approach to the satisfaction of recognized
material interests with the visionary invocation of a reordered society. In
nations striving for democracy that are trapped in these impoverished
visions and systems, nothing is more important than encouraging the
belief in the people that structural change is possible. The Haitian gov-
ernment and the international community must encourage such beliefs
and actions.
More than fourteen years after the deployment of the multinational
force, it is clear that Haiti's struggle for internal security and economic,
social, and political development-its attempt to become a democratic
nation-will continue to be a tortuous one. Unsettled political condi-
tions, weak management of the economy, public indifference to the elec-
toral process, and grinding poverty underscore how poorly the
international intervention has succeeded in helping to create the condi-
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tions for democracy. Some may, therefore, conclude that only Haitians
can overcome the legacy of their history. Even if one ultimately reaches
this conclusion, it is also correct to add that the international community
is essential if Haitians are to achieve their goal. But only the correct
international incentives directed at the real problems will lead to a
democracy in countries like Haiti. So far, those incentives have simply
not been properly employed.
EPILOGUE: A FINAL THOUGHT
Stan's view of constitutionalism suggests another crucial point in
the creation and development of constitutional democracies-the impor-
tance of a constitutional adjudicative tradition. In the United States, for
example, the establishment of a constitutional adjudicative tradition and
certain forms of remedies, such as structurally transforming injunctive
remedies, have aided in the process of protecting human rights by estab-
lishing methods of rational discourse that have helped to develop a
moral consciousness in the citizenry. This tradition, exemplified by
Brown v. Board of Education16" ' and its progeny, and the decisions inter-
preting the guarantees of the Bill of Rights,' 62 has led to the protection
of human rights.
Many Latin American and other nations striving for constitutional
democracies have failed to develop this type of constitutional adjudica-
tive tradition. Although fragile, such a process can be useful to develop-
ing democracies. My thesis is that the process of constitutional
adjudication has been significant in the United States precisely because
it establishes a tradition that ultimately protects individuals against the
arbitrary actions of government. This tradition, by helping to create a
161. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
162. Although cases such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (banned racial
segregation in public schools), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (recognized the principle
of one person-one vote), are often viewed as the most significant modem decisions, and although
they were certainly great steps forward for the nation and the Constitution, I believe that the
decisions incorporating the guarantees of the Bill of Rights were even more significant. These
decisions bind the states to almost all of the restraints of the Bill of Rights. The vehicle for this
impressive development was the Fourteenth Amendment. Simply put, it has served as the legal
instrument of an egalitarian revolution-a revolution in judicial legal method as well as in
substance. The Supreme Court employed this amendment, as well as the other Civil War
amendments, to protect citizens from the employment of government authority that violates our
national conceptions of human dignity and liberty. The United States has been radically
transformed by the standards, promises, and power of the Fourteenth Amendment. Citizens of all
states are now no less citizens of the United States. Each person is entitled to due process and
equal protection of the laws from all levels of government, state as well as federal. For an
elaboration of this theme see Irwin P. Stotzky, Federalism, Judicial Review, and the Protection of
Individual Rights (Aug. 5, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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moral consciousness in the citizenry through the process of rational dis-
course, has acted as a barrier against abuses by the government.
At the same time, however, a caveat is in order. The constitutional
adjudicative tradition is not a magic elixir that will cure all the diseases
of any society attempting to consolidate a democracy. It may be that
such a tradition is not wholly sufficient to protect these rights even in a
developed democracy. In the United States, for example, it is also true
that the tradition has not always been faithful to the premise of develop-
ing and perpetuating moral consciousness. Indeed, since the early 1970s,
the Rehnquist-led Court has interpreted Bill of Rights' guarantees in a
manner calculated to restrict their scope severely. The current Bush
Administration has, of course, attempted to dilute these precious rights
even further. I believe that it is not the necessary outcome of such a
tradition, but the failure to adhere to its stringent demands, that has led
to an erosion and derogation of the very human rights that are meant to
be celebrated.
Furthermore, the methods of adjudication established in the United
States are not necessarily transferable to developing democracies. Dif-
ferences in cultures, history, and the role of law in each specific nation
shape and define the methods of adjudication. Nevertheless, I believe
that the establishment of a constitutional adjudicative tradition in these
nations making the transition to democracy will be extraordinarily
important in perpetuating respect for the rule of law and ultimately will
act as a barrier against deprivations of human rights.
It is, therefore, critically important for nations attempting to make
the transition from authoritarian rule to democratic rule to consolidate
the rule of law. This is important not only to secure respect for funda-
mental rights and for the observance of the democratic process, but also
to achieve satisfactory levels of economic and social development. It is
also necessary-and obvious-that the consolidation of the rule of law,
with the consequent overcoming of "dumb anomie," requires strengthen-
ing the independence, reliability, and efficiency of the judicial process.
To do this, nations must satisfy the guarantees which derive from
the idea of due process of law. These guarantees are concerned with the
way in which an act of State coercion-which because of its very nature
infringes upon an individual right and thus must be specially justified-
may be exerted against a particular individual. The general principle in a
liberal democracy is that when a government act coercively deprives an
individual of a vital good, as many independent powers of the state as
possible should intervene to ensure that such an act is truly necessary for
the good of society. The legislative branch of government necessarily
intervenes in regulating constitutional rights. It draws a balance between
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constitutional rights and determines the conditions under which some of
them may be limited for the sake of others. While the necessary general-
ity of this legislation guarantees some degree of impartiality, it is clear
that the power may be arbitrarily applied. Thus, the power of the state to
perpetrate an act of coercion against an individual must necessarily be
mediated by an independent judicial power. Indeed, the ideal of a liberal
democracy is that a judge should always intervene between an individual
and an act of state coercion.
As many commentators argue, 163 there are two main justifications
for interposing a measure of due process between the coercive depriva-
tion of a good and the individual who is the victim of it. The first is an
intrinsic value resulting from the fact that the individual in question is
not merely an object to be manipulated, but rather is part of a dialogue in
which the prosecution tries to convince him of the rightness of the coer-
cion, as part of a cooperative search for truth. The second justification
ascribes to due process an instrumental value; it is viewed as a mecha-
nism for the impartial application of laws. Both justifications, of course,
complement each other. To have a dialogue in which the person affected
is an active part of the power process is the best way of achieving impar-
tial applications of the law.
The general guarantee of due process of law implies a series of
other guarantees; for example, those due process guarantees associated
with access to the jurisdiction of courts. Thus, there must be guarantees
related to the conditions for standing, the availability of appropriate rem-
edies, such as habeas corpus and injunctions, which protect basic rights,
the guarantee against being tried in absentia, the possibility of appeals,
the availability of legal assistance, the proximity of courts, the openness
of the judicial procedure, and the efficiency and expedience of that
procedure.
Other crucial due process guarantees are those due process guaran-
tees related to the characteristics that the judicial process must satisfy,
which include: (a) the observance of the democratically enacted laws;
(b) the unrestricted search for the truth about the facts; and (c) the
impartiality of the judge between the parties involved in the process.
Additional implied guarantees include those due process guarantees
associated with the conditions that state coercion must fulfill, such as
not imposing cruel or inhumane punishment, being rational in enforcing
the purpose of social protection that the law was passed to meet,
allowing the individual the possibility of avoiding prosecution and pun-
163. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666-67 (2d ed. 1988); Irwin
P. Stotzky & Alan C. Swan, Due Process Methodology and Prisoner Exchange Treaties:
Confronting an Uncertain Calculus, 62 MINN. L. REv. 733 (1978).
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ishment if he complies with the legal requirement (an idea which rejects
retroactive and vague legislation), and not punishing an individual for
the commission of involuntary acts.
In many nations which have attempted to make the transition to
democracy, the ideal of due process of law has not been actively
enforced. Indeed, respect for the guarantees of due process has often
suffered from considerable oscillations and from a combination of pro-
gressive constitutional and legislative acts and judicial decisions that
intentionally disregard those guarantees. This has occurred despite the
fact that such guarantees are recognized in most of the constitutions of
these nations.' 64
Moreover, although it is clear that the guarantees in the constitu-
tions of these nations do not explicitly include many of the necessary
remedial devices, such as habeas corpus and injunctions, which allow
access to the administration of justice, it is obvious that without proper
remedial devices the rights become meaningless. To put it another way,
the existence of efficacious remedies inheres in the very rights guaran-
teed in a liberal democracy. In spite of this recognition, many of these
nations do not have remedies sufficient to protect guaranteed rights, of,
if they do have the necessary remedies, the authorities have been almost
powerless to enforce them.
Legal assistance is another guarantee that is sorely lacking in many
of these nations. For example, such assistance in many nations is quite
costly, in part as a result of the length of the judicial proceedings.
Although there are some mechanisms for free legal assistance-such as
lawyers for poor and incompetent people-the procedures for
appointing lawyers to cases is extremely inefficient. In addition, these
lawyers defend relatively few cases, such as those involving minors or
the mentally incompetent. There are also mechanisms for legal assis-
tance organized by municipalities or lawyers associations, but these are
equally inefficient and insufficient. It is also true that courts are not gen-
erally accessible to large segments of the population, both because of
geographical location and because their procedures are too cumbersome,
expensive, and slow for dealing with the kinds of controversies common
to the large majority of the population.
The judicial process itself raises grave concerns. In Argentina, for
example, there has historically been institutional instability because of
the large degree of dependence by the courts, particularly by the
Supreme Court, on the political process. The Argentine Supreme Court,
as in many of these nations' supreme courts, is unstable because it fre-
164. Examples, of course, include Argentina and Haiti.
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quently reverses its own opinions and because its justices are frequently
replaced. Indeed, almost every new government has had a judiciary of
their own choice. For example, during the military regimes, one of the
first acts was to assault the judicial power. The military leaders selected
judges who would legitimize the military's seizure of power. With the
return of civilian government, the opportunity to shape the judiciary
came directly after the previous military assault on it. Nevertheless, in
some of the civilian governments, particularly President Alfonsin's gov-
ernment, the judiciary maintained its independence.
The due process guarantees which should be granted in the course
of the judicial process are further impaired in these nations because of
the extreme slowness of the proceedings, the secretness and exaggerated
ritualism in which they are conducted, the delegation of many judicial
functions to clerical employees, the ex parte communications many
judges engage in, and so forth. All of these factors destroy the impartial-
ity and expediency of the administration of justice.
There are also problems in complying with the requirement of
legality under which coercion may be exerted by the State. The major
problems about the conditions that acts of coercion must satisfy have to
do with the ways in which government detains people and treats them
from arrest through imprisonment. The problem runs deeper. Large
numbers of acts of torture and maltreatment on the part of the police and
paramilitary forces are still reported, though they have certainly dimin-
ished since reestablishment of democracy. Prisons are crowded,
unhealthy and non-rehabilitative places. There have been several inmate
uprisings in these countries. Perhaps the most grievous situation is that
of people held in detention during the entire length of their trial, without
any possibility of parole. They are in almost the same conditions as con-
victs, and often the trial lasts so long that they serve the entire sentence
for a crime for which they may later be found not guilty. Moreover, they
are not allowed any compensation for this preventive detention. Further,
many judges tend to convict a detainee after he has been in prison for
such a long time. In their minds, a retroactive conviction legitimates the
detainee's imprisonment.
However depressing these factors appear to be, and however
debilitating to the strengthening of the rule of law and the consolidation
of democracy, all is not lost. There are signs of hope. For example,
major progress in the procedural conditions for the protection of human
rights has been effected by the ratification of several international agree-
ments in some nations undergoing the transition to democracy, such as
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the American Convention on Human Rights, 165, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, 166 with the optional protocol, and in
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 167
165. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
166. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
167. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
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